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Abstract 
One of the major problems of copyright regulations in the digital and network era is 
that the Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies are overriding the freedom 
incorporated within the copyright regulations in the analog world. The override 
problem partly comes from the strict implementation of the DRM systems by the 
market, and partly from the anti-circumvention regulations that almost blindly protect 
such implementation. This research reviews the scope of anti-circumvention 
regulations by introducing Japanese regulations, which are rather modest, and by 
comparing with the U.S. regulations. It also extensively analyzes the market 
mechanisms that cause rather strict implementation of DRM systems based on 
interviews of key persons in the market. At the end, it suggests several legal options to 
improve the problem of freedom override by DRM technologies, either by direct legal 
means or through market mechanisms, to keep a better balance of interests between 
right-holders and users of copyrighted information. 
 
1. Introduction 
Digital and network technologies have dramatically changed the world of 
copyright. They are used not only to exploit and distribute copyrighted works, but also 
to control the usage of copyright, often referred to as Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) technologies. One major problem is that the DRM technologies are overriding 
the freedom incorporated within the copyright regulations in the analog world. Even 
2worse, such override is often supported by the anti-circumvention regulations which 
prohibit the circumvention of DRM technologies. This problem has been discussed 
rather extensively,1 however, we still do not see a substantial improvement. This 
article is to research the reason of this slow change, and to suggest possible 
improvements in law to assist the solution to this problem of overriding freedom. 
This article uses two approach that has not been seen in the past. One is to provide 
lessons learned from comparing contemporary copyright regulations in the U.S. and 
Japan. Japanese scholars have not been particularly active in discussions about the 
digital dilemma, especially outside the Japanese domestic forum. This is a pity, 
because Japanese regulations are relatively unique and different from those of the U.S. 
in several material respects. By explaining the Japanese legislation and comparing it 
with the U.S. regulation, it shows the flexibility in implementing the two WIPO 
Treaties in 1996 (the WIPO Copyright Treaty [WCT], and the WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty [WPPT], which are collectively referred to as the 1996 WIPO 
Treaties), and how the difference impacts the society. 
Another contribution this article attempts to make is including some of the voices 
from the market in the course of the analysis. Copyright regulations, digital and 
 
1 See, infra note 15, 18. 
3network technologies, and market (business model) and social norms (i.e., people’s 
perceptions about copyrighted works) are becoming more closely related to each other 
in the digital and network environment. Previous research in the field, however, does 
not contain enough clear and verbatim expression of the thinking and ideas of people 
currently working in the marketplace. This article includes quotes from these 
interviews and conference remarks, in order to illustrate the thoughts and experiences 
which are actually forming the practice in this growing field on a daily basis.2
Through these interviews, this article analyzes the reason why the implementation of 
the DRM technologies tend to be restricting, and concludes that it is rather difficult for 
the market to self-correct this unbalanced implementation. 
At the end, using these two research methods, this article suggests the following 
three possible options to change the anti-circumvention regulations. One is to repeal 
the current anti-circumvention regulations when the implementation of the DRM 
technologies fail to consider the balance. It also analyze why repealing part of 
 
2 The author conducted many interviews of the key players in the digital networking fields to get their 
views. Included are executives and other businesspeople in Internet-related businesses, including 
right-holders, content providers, vendors, and systems designers. The interviews were conducted as free 
discussions; i.e., the author presented topics and asked the interviewees to discuss what they cared about 
or what concerned them the most about each topic. The author felt that this would be a reasonable way 
to avoid asking possibly biased questions. The results were recorded and transcribed. Interviews in 
Japanese were translated into English by the author. The transcripts presented in this article may have 
been edited on a grammatical level, but not further. Some of the remarks are from major conferences in 
the research field. The actual speeches were recorded and transcribed by the author. All the positions or 
titles that appear in this article are the ones at the time of the interview. 
4anti-circumvention regulations may not be as problematic as it may appear. The second 
is to expand the exemption to anti-circumvention regulations, or “the right to hack.” 
The third is to support the effort to incorporate the freedom within copyright regime 
into the DRM systems by tailoring copyright law. 
Section 2 briefly describes the problems caused by DRM technologies: the 
problem of overriding freedom. Section 3 introduces the anti-circumvention 
regulations over DRM technologies in the U.S. and Japan, and the problems caused by 
these regulations, with special attention to the difference between Japan and the U.S.  
Section 4 studies some reasons for biased DRM implementation based upon interviews 
of the key players in the DRM arena, and analyzes whether such unbalanced 
implementation could be improved by market mechanisms. Section 5 looks into legal 
tools that might help solve the problem of overriding freedom. Section 6 concludes 
this article. 
2. Brief Overview of DRM Technologies 
Although there are many definitions of DRM technologies,3 this article will refer 
collectively to technologies that control access to or exploitation of digital materials as 
 
3 See., Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 323, 324 n6 (2004). 
5“DRM technologies.” More concretely, encryption, watermark, metadata (especially 
“rights expression languages,” or “REL”) are among the technologies that are heavily 
used to control access to and exploitation of digital materials. Some systems can allow 
copyright owners to control users’ ability to view or listen to materials (access control). 
The same systems, or different ones, can control users’ ability to print, copy, download, 
upload, perform, distribute, modify, or otherwise exploit digital materials in a manner 
that is regulated by copyright law (usage control).4
2.1 Pros of DRM Technologies 
Overall, DRM technologies are thought to be an important enabler of new business 
models by right-holders and content distributors. First, DRM technologies can reduce 
the nonexclusivity of intangible content. Copyrighted works are often claimed to be 
public goods in an economic sense, which results in an undersupply of those goods in 
the market.5 Using DRM technologies, one can, at least in part, fix the problem of 
nonexclusivity.6 This can turn digital content into a marketable good. Second, as a 
result, DRM technologies help right-holders generate different business models for the 
 
4 See, Bill Rosenblatt et al., DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY (M&T Books 
2002). See, also, Bechtold, Id. at 326-31. 
5 See, e.g., PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 593 (Prentice Hall 5th ed. 2000). 
6 Of course, if there is the same content available without any restrictions, DRM systems that are partly 
applied to the content cannot eliminate the problem of nonexclusivity in a complete manner. However, 
because of the transaction cost to get the unrestricted content, content providers still form a market with 
people who are willing to pay for the DRM-employed content. 
6same content. For example, DRM technologies can enable a price-discrimination 
model in a more secure way by combining technologically enforced usage restrictions 
and prices. If based on an economic judgment that a price-discrimination model 
increases social welfare by reducing deadweight loss compared to monopoly without 
price discrimination, DRM may be said to help increase such social welfare by 
sustaining such price-discrimination models.7
Third, DRM-based transactions are often claimed to reduce the transaction cost of 
content distribution in various ways, if designed wisely and properly.8 It can reduce 
the costs of rights clearance by providing a direct license online, and enable direct 
distribution along with monetary transactions from creators to end users without an 
intermediary.9
Finally, DRM technologies may be able to provide protection (or security) to make 
 
7 There is an important suggestion made by Wendy Gordon, however, that such “increase of social 
welfare” brought by price discrimination is only when compared to a monopoly market without price 
discrimination. Gordon warns that price discrimination does not legitimatize the shift from free use to 
controlled use with price discrimination, as free use often provides more social welfare than monopoly 
that is required as prerequisite to price discrimination. See, Wendy Gordon, “Intellectual Property as 
Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract” (Symposium on the Internet and Legal Theory), 73 
Chi. Kent. L. Rev. 1367. 
8 However, the actual effect of reducing the transaction cost heavily depends upon the design of the 
DRM systems that are actually implemented. If poorly designed, they may even increase the transaction 
cost. For example, badly designed DRM players will take a great deal of time and energy for users to 
install and handle, and impose high cost on service providers to provide users’ support. 
9 Direct distribution is more the fruit of network technologies than of DRM technologies. However, 
DRM technologies actually help enable businesses by providing payment mechanisms or increasing 
nonexclusivity.  
7content providers feel safe enough to release their content.10 For example, NTT 
Docomo, a Japanese company that first in the world created the mobile content 
distribution business model, explained that one of the reasons for their success was 
technological protections. Toshihiro Kuwabara, a member of the legal department of 
NTT Docomo explains: 
The concept [of i-mode business] is to provide superior service at a low 
price. For example, downloading ring-tones costs 300 yen. We asked 
content owners to provide a low-priced license based on the fact that 
handsets are designed to prohibit copying of ring-tones among users. 
The fact that users are incapable of transferring ring-tones is a very 
important point in making the price inexpensive.11 
Bob Ohlweiler, Senior Vice President of Business Development at Musicmatch, an 
online Windows-based music store, explains the importance of providing a secure 
system as follows: 
The bottom line is [that] we live in a world now where you can take a 
piece of valuable content and make unlimited numbers of perfect copies 
of it, so we go back to the problem which I believe is solved, which is, 
convincing the people who own the content to let us commercialize it in 
a digital medium. But part of the deal was you have to keep it somewhat 
safe from that kind of mass piracy.…Without DRM …, it will be very 
difficult for us to convince all the rights holders to give us access to 
commercialize the contents.12 
10 However, this effect heavily depends upon how much security content owners ask in order to release 
their content. Often times, the level of security that content owners ask is very high, or not precise that it 
creates a lot of confusion and loss in the market of technology research and development. 
11 Interview with Toshihiro Kuwabara, NTT Docomo, in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 20, 2002). 
12 Bob Ohlweiler, Address at Digital Hollywood Spring 2005 (Mar. 30, 2005) 
8Content owners agree. Amanda Marks, Senior Vice President of eLabs at Universal 
Music Group, made it clear: “We are not going to sell our content in an unprotected 
format.”13 
2.2 Cons of DRM Technologies and New Problems 
As DRM technologies can have several positive functions in content distribution, 
they also create several concerns and problems. One of the problems that DRM 
technologies override and diminish the freedom incorporated in the copyright regime, 
as described below.14 
2.2.1 Diminishing Freedom Incorporated into the Copyright Regime 
There are four categories in which “freedom of speech” is reserved within the 
copyright law:15 (1) idea/expression dichotomy; (2) copyright exemption such as fair 
use (in the U.S.) and copyright limitation statutes (in Japan); (3) copyright duration; 
and (4) what is outside the scope of copyright protection. Courts have acknowledged 
such freedom within the copyright regime. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
 
13 Id. 
14 There is another whole set of problem regarding privacy, which is outside the scope of this research. 
For details, See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, What the publisher can teach the patient: intellectual property 
and privacy in an era of trusted privication, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1201 (2000); Jonathan Weinberg, 
Hardware-Based Id, Rights Management, and Trusted Systems, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1251 (2000); MARK 
STEFIK, THE INTERNET EDGE: SOCIAL, LEGAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES FOR A NETWORKED WORLD 
197-231 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).  
15 See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer in his article, Does Copyright Abridge The First Amendment 
Guarantees of Free Speech And Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970), Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev.1 (2001). 
9Harper & Row,16 declared that First Amendment protections are “already embodied in 
the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable 
facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by 
fair use.”17 
However, DRM technologies, by being implemented and enforced in a way that 
overrides the legal rules set by copyright law, diminish these freedoms.18 It can 
enclose the public domain, or can eliminate the copyright exemption. The conflict with 
fair use and other non-infringing uses created by DRM technologies is well recognized 
even by the U.S. courts.19 
In addition, DRM technologies that are used to control people’s access to 
copyrighted work override the principle of “free access” in copyright law. Such 
phenomena were hardly observed in the analog era, simply because it was very costly 
to do so. You are free to walk around and peep into books that you are interested in, or 
can even read the entire book without violating copyright regulations. However, such 
 
16 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
17 471 U.S. at 560. 
18 See, e.g., Bechtold, supra note 3, Yochai Benkler, Free as the air to common use: First Amendment 
constraints on enclosure of the public domain, 74 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); Mark A. Lemley and 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of speech and injunctions in intellectual property cases, 48 Duke L. J. 147 
(1998), Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in 
Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981 (1996). 
19 See, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub 
nom. Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F. 3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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freedom either is not granted or is very limited when it comes to DRM-protected 
works.20 As a result, it reduces a chance for people to be exposed to many kinds of 
information, or at least biases the kind of information that people can freely access.  
2.2.2 Two Sources of the Override Problem 
These problems of DRM technologies overriding freedom within the copyright 
regime come primarily from two sources: one from the manner in which the DRM 
technologies are implemented, and the other from the difference between computers 
and human beings as decision makers. 
The problems of overriding copyright “freedom” can be partially avoided when 
DRM technologies are implemented in a considerate way. Usage rules designed to 
implement DRM technologies can be loose enough to respect the “safety valve” inside 
the copyright law: for example, allowing some private copies; allowing content to be 
transferred to a friend and family; excluding the public domain from the portfolio with 
DRM protection; and allowing as much preview as possible before purchase.21 
20 Many kinds of DRM-software are available for document control. See, e.g., Adobe, 
http://www.adobe.com/security/main.html,(last visited April 25, 2006); DRM functions in Microsoft 
Office 2003, http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/office/office2003/maintain/rmsirm.mspx, 
(last visited April 25, 2006). 
21 For an attempt to create or define such user-friendly rules in the DRM implementation, see, Digital 
Media Project, http://www.dmpf.org/, (last visited April 25, 2006). It states, as one of their mission, to 
map rights and usages traditionally enjoyed by users to the Digital Media space. See,
http://www.dmpf.org/manifesto/dmm.htm#3.1.1., (last visited April 25, 2006). 
11 
Michael Miron, the CEO of ContentGuard, Inc., makes this point clear: 
[One] misleading assertion … is that somehow DRM will necessarily 
erode consumer rights such as fair use and first sale…. There is a fair 
amount of belief that DRM somehow is going to take away legal rights 
necessarily, and therefore we have to ban it, stop it, undermine it, no 
matter what. This is misleading. DRM certainly can be misused in this 
way, but … this is really a systems’ implementation issue…. [Y]ou can 
use, for example, the MPEG well to create a license grant to mimic fair 
use for particular domains.22 
However, so far, copyright owners and content providers tend to provide usage 
rules that are much less flexible than what was possible under the copyright law in the 
analog world.23 Whether this problem can be solved by the market will be analyzed 
below in Section 4. 
Secondly, even if copyright owners and users of copyrighted works fully agree to 
set very flexible DRM usage rules, there still remains a problem of whether DRM 
technologies are capable of providing the same freedom as was allowed in the analog 
setting. The control and judgment made by computers and human beings (especially 
judges) are different in nature. Especially, DRM technologies can behave only as they 
are programmed, and are not good at considering the purpose or the situation of the 
use. Given such nature, Section 5 suggests to combine human intelligence with 
 
22 Michael Miron, Opening Keynote Speech at Digital Rights Management Strategies 2004 conference 
(April 13, 2004). 
23 See, e.g., Bechtold, supra note 3 at, 340 footnote 84, 344-6 (explaining that DRM technologies are 
often used to enforce strict contractual terms). 
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computers to embody the freedom properly within the DRM system. 
3. Anti-circumvention Regulations in the U.S. and Japan 
If DRM technologies are causing this override problems, one of the easy solutions 
would be to take away the cause of the problems: i.e., to circumvent DRM 
technologies when problematic. However, such a solution is prohibited by the 
anti-circumvention regulations. “Anti-circumvention regulations,” in a narrow sense, 
usually refers to two kinds of regulations. One is the “direct circumvention 
regulation,” which prohibits the acts of circumventing technological protection 
measures, such as “usage control” and “access control.” The other is “anti-device 
regulation” (or “indirect circumvention regulation”), which regulates production 
and/or dissemination of devices and/or information that allows people to circumvent 
technological protection measures. Here, “usage control” is referred to as 
technological measures that control the usage or exploitation of works for which 
copyright owners have rights defined in copyright law (such as rights to reproduce, 
modify, distribute, or perform). “Access control” is referred to as technological 
measures to control people’s access to copyrighted materials (including viewing, 
reading, and listening to the materials).  
13 
Legislators also decided to prohibit alteration of copyright management 
information,24 which is often referred to as “copyright management information 
regulations.” This article collectively refers to these two regulations using the 
expression “anti-circumvention regulations,” unless otherwise indicated, to make the 
argument simple, because their functions and problems overlap with each other in 
many areas. 
Anti-circumvention regulations have their bases in the 1996 WIPO Treaties, which 
require contracting parties to provide legal protection remedies against “the 
circumvention of effective technological measures” 25  and “rights management 
information.”26 In the U.S., Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”) in 1998 in order to implement the 1996 WIPO Treaties.27 For the same 
reason, Japan amended the Copyright Law28 and Unfair Competition Prevention 
Law29 in 1999. 
In the following, this Section describes the substance of anti-circumvention 
 
24 Here, “copyright management information” refers to information attached to copyrighted work for 
the purpose of managing copyright, including metadata such as REL description of licensing terms, 
names of right-holders, and copyright terms. 
25 WCT Article 11 and WPPT Article 18. 
26 WCT Article 12 and WPPT Article 19.  
27 17 U.S.C. Chapter 12. 
28 Article 2 Paragraph 1 Items 20 and 21; Article 30 Paragraph 1 Item 2; Article 113 Paragraphs 3 and 
4; Article 119 Item 1; Article 120 bis items 1, 2, and 3; and Article 123. 
29 Article 2 Paragraph 1 Items 10 and 11, and Article 2 Paragraphs 5 and 6. 
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regulations, with an emphasis on explaining the Japanese regulations and comparing 
between the U.S. and Japan (3.1), and some pros and cons of anti-circumvention 
regulations (3.2 and 3.3). 
3.1 Substance of Anti-circumvention Regulations 
3.1.1 Direct Circumvention Regulation 
3.1.1.1 Japanese Regulations 
In Japan, the scope of direct circumvention regulations is very limited compared to 
that of the U.S. in two major aspects: the scope of protected technologies and the effect 
of violation. 
First, in terms of protected technologies, Japanese copyright law protects only 
usage controls, and not access control.30 Article 2 Item 20 of the Copyright Law of 
Japan defines “technological protection measures” as “measures to prevent or deter 
such acts as constitute infringements on moral rights or copyright … or neighboring 
rights.” 
According to the legislative history, the rationale behind this limitation is that 
 
30 See, ?????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ???????? [Daisuke Yoshida et al., Part I: Amendment of the Copyright 
Law, in COMMENTARY ON COPYRIGHT LAW AND UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION LAW ], 95 (Research 
Group for Copyright Law & Section for Intellectual Property Policy at the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry ed., Yuhikaku 1999). 
15 
copyright law should support only established rights entitled in the law, but nothing 
further. It is stated that, because copyright owners do not have a right to monopolize 
mere access to copyrighted works by people, protection of access control technologies 
should be outside the scope of the Copyright Law.31 Nobuhiro Nakayama, Chief of the 
Copyright Council for the legislation of anti-circumvention regulations, explains why 
the legislation avoided regulation over access control: “because regulating people’s 
access [to information] includes a broader problem that is beyond the issue of 
protecting property: that is, academic freedom, freedom of speech, right to access, 
etc.”32 He recognizes voices that express concerns about the practical efficiency of the 
regulations because of the “lack of protection toward access control.” However, 
Nakayama explains that the legislation chose the moderate or prudent regulation on 
access “because the issue of controlling access to information has an enormous impact, 
good or bad, for the society in the information age to come. Therefore, a long-term 
careful discussion is necessary.”33 
31 See, ???????????????????????????????????????
?????? 10? 12? 10?? [the Multi-media Subcommittee of the Copyright Council, the Final 
Report of the Working Group regarding Technological Protection and Control] dated December 10, 
1998, Section 2.4, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/12/chosaku/toushin/981201.htm#2-4,
(last visited April 25, 2006). However, it is questionable whether the distinction between usage control 
and access control ban be made clear. 
32 See, Yoshida et al., supra note 30 at ii. 
33 Id. 
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Second, situations in which direct circumvention of usage control technologies is 
prohibited are very limited. Circumvention of usage control by users is prohibited only 
when users do so in order to make private usage of protected works (which is 
otherwise exempt from copyright under Article 30).34 In sum, circumvention of usage 
control only causes the loss of statutory exemption regarding private copies and 
modification of such works (thereby making circumventor liable for reproduction and 
modification of the work). 35  Circumvention for the purposes of other statutory 
exemptions, such as reproduction in libraries, quotation, and educational purposes, is 
generally regarded to be allowed under Japanese copyright law.36 
Because the scope of regulation is very limited, especially because it does not 
regulate access control, there is no statutory exemption regarding the direct 
circumvention regulations in Japanese copyright law. 
3.1.1.2 Difference between the U.S. and Japan 
The largest difference between the direct circumvention regulation in the U.S. and 
Japan is whether it includes access control. Although the U.S. Federal Circuit 
 
34 Of course, the resulting copyright infringement which became possible because of the circumvention 
of usage control is regulated by traditional copyright law, which is not a direct effect of circumvention. 
35 Article 30 Paragraph 1 Item 2 of the Copyright Law of Japan. 
36 See, Yoshida et al., supra note 30 at 95. In such a case, although not clearly stated, reproductions 
necessarily made in the course of exempted uses should be also exempted regardless of Article 30 
Paragraph 1 Item 2. 
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recognizes the principle of free access under copyright law,37 it concludes that it was 
Congress’s intention to prohibit circumvention of access control that leads to the 
exploitation of copyright.38 On the other hand, Japan decided not to regulate direct 
circumvention under copyright law, paying full respect to the principle of free access. 
The second difference is the respect for copyright exemptions. In Japan, 
circumvention for the purposes exempted under copyright law is allowed, thereby 
giving exemptions priority over the regulation of circumvention. This issue is treated 
in a more unfriendly manner for users in the U.S.39 
The conflict between fair use and anti-circumvention regulations had already been 
recognized at the time of legislation in the U.S.40 For example, the Second Circuit 
states that §1201 (c)(1) does not justify circumvention for the purpose of fair use.41 
Therefore, as Ginsburg points out, §1201 (c) is “irrelevant” to the problem of 
diminishing fair use chances.42 
Difference in culture or social norms between the two countries may have some 
 
37 Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
38 Id. at 1197-1203. 
39 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the 
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519, (1999) 
40 ?????????????????????? 3????????????? [Hideki 
Nokata, The Optimal Use of Copyright Management Information and Its Problems] 443 footnote 13 
(2001).
41 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001). 
42 See, Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1, 8, 
(2000). 
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influence in the different treatment regarding the “right to hack for fair use.” Although 
an amendment to allow people to “hack for fair use” has been proposed in the U.S., it 
was unsuccessful because of the concerns of the “misuse” of such a right. As Kevin 
Saul, Director of the Trademark, Copyright & Corporation, Marketing and Legal 
Department of Apple Computer, Inc. says: 
If we state fair use as a right, I think there would be more abuses of 
copyright. It is different from “Well, it could be an infringement, or 
could be fair use.” Because that is how I support the business people. 
They are very loose minded on fair use. It really helps to say to them, 
“look, if we are not sure it’s fair use, it’s an infringement.43 
Yoshisuke Kuroda, General Manager of the Planning Department, Network 
Application & Solutions Division of Sony Corporation has a similar impression: 
[Our DRM design called] “Open MG” is based on specifications 
decided in SDMI.44 Therefore, you can check in and check out content 
to portable devices three times. In Japan, when we released the Open 
MG, both end users and right-holders accepted the rule almost without 
any opposition or resistance because it is based on SDMI. However, in 
the U.S., there is still resistance in the market. We have already released 
the devices in the U.S. market, but both media and users give us 
comments or complaints like “why is there such restrictions?” I don’t 
know whether such a difference comes from cultural differences, or 
whether the U.S. people have a stronger feeling toward Fair Use 
“rights.” Anyway, I feel a real difference.45 
43 Interview with Kevin Saul, Director, Apple Computer Inc., in Cupertino, Cal. (Nov. 20, 2003). 
44 The Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) is a forum of more than 200 companies to discuss data 
protection of digitalized music in the world of digital and network technologies. It released 
technological specifications in 1999-2001, but was never widely implemented as a common commercial 
platform. See, http://www.sdmi.org/ (last visited April 25, 2006). 
45 Interview with Yoshisuke Kuroda, General Manager, Sony Corporation, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 17, 
19 
3.1.2 Anti-device Regulation (or Indirect Circumvention Regulation) 
3.1.2.1 Japanese Regulations 
It is a strange twist that Japan is very modest regarding direct circumvention 
regulations while rather aggressive regarding anti-device regulation. This is mainly 
because of the amendment of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law (UCPL), the 
idea of which was to “protect the services that rely on access control,” while regulation 
under the Copyright Law is as modest as direct circumvention regulation is.  
3.1.2.1.1 Copyright Law 
In Japan, the scope of anti-device regulations is also limited under the copyright 
law. In terms of protected technologies, anti-device regulation also focuses only on 
usage control and not on access control. The rationale is the same as that for direct 
circumvention regulations described above.46 
The scope of acts that are regulated is narrower than most other implementation 
examples. The key points are: (a) devices are limited to those with the “principal 
function” of circumventing technological protection measures, which is narrower than 
devices with “only limited commercially significant purpose for use other than” 
 
2002). 
46 See, supra Section 3.1.1.1. 
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circumvention in the U.S.; (b) the dissemination is limited to the public; and (c) 
remedies are granted only through criminal procedures. 
To explain in more detail, the definition of devices that are regulated is a “device 
having a principle function for the circumvention of technological protection measures 
(such a device includes such a set of parts of a device as can be easily assembled) or 
copies of a program having the principal function circumvention of technological 
protection measures.”47 
And the efforts that are regulated under anti-device regulations are: (1) to transfer 
to the public the ownership of; (2) to lend to the public; (3) to manufacture, import or 
possess for transfer of ownership or lending to the public; or (4) to offer for use by the 
public those circumventing devices.48 Manufacturing such a device and transferring a 
copyrighted work to a specific person does not constitute a violation of this regulation. 
The reason for limiting device regulation to actions toward the public is to limit the 
regulation to actions that have a large impact on the interests of copyright owners.49 
In addition, there is only a criminal statute and there is no civil remedy for the 
violation. According to the official commentary, this is because copyright owners can 
 
47 Article 120 bis Paragraph 1 the Copyright Law of Japan. 
48 Id. 
49 See, Yoshida et al., supra note 30 at 97. 
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anticipate the circumvention of usage control of copyrighted materials at the time of 
manufacture or offer of the circumventing devices, and thus it is regarded that the 
interest of the copyright owner is not mature enough to be granted civil remedies based 
on specific copyrighted materials.50 
3.1.2.1.2 Unfair Competition Prevention Law 
As can be seen above, anti-device regulation is rather limited in the Copyright Law 
in Japan. However, the National Diet at the same time amended the UCPL to regulate 
circumventing devices for access control, based on an approach of competition 
regulation rather than of copyright protection.51 That is, in the UCPL, the anti-device 
regulation is much broader compared to that under copyright law as described above.52 
First, it is broad in a sense that the anti-device regulation under the UCPL includes 
both usage control and access control. The idea is to protect the businesses of content 
providers who charge fees for providing technologically controlled content, and from 
 
50 Id. at 99. 
51 The official commentary explains that the UCPL does not regulate the act of circumvention (by using 
circumventing devices) because such circumvention would be difficult to find and would give less 
damage compared to the commercial sale of the devices. See, Yoshida et al., supra note 30 at 244. 
52 Article 2 Paragraph 1 Item 10 of the UCPL defines as unfair competition: commercially transfer, 
display for transfer, export and import of devices and software program; and public transmission of 
software program; that has the sole function of circumventing technological measures commercially 
employed to control the access and copy of images, sounds and software programs. Item 11 prohibits the 
same conduct listed in Item 10 for the purpose of circumventing technological protection measures 
commercially employed on services that allows specific audiences to access or copy images, sounds and 
software programs. [Official English translation of the UCPL not available.] 
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this perspective, the distinctions between usage and access that are relevant under 
copyright law are not competent. 
Second, the regulation in the UCPL lacks a distinction between copyrighted 
materials and the public domain, because this regulation is designed to be outside the 
copyright regime. From the perspective of unfair competition among content providers, 
it is claimed to be unimportant whether the distributed materials are copyrighted or not. 
Any kind of digitalized materials can be commercial goods for fair competition. 
Therefore, it does not matter whether the materials the entrepreneurs provide are 
copyrighted or not. Content providers who are providing others’ copyrighted materials 
or even materials in the public domain can seek civil remedies based on the UCPL. 
Third, the UCPL does not limit the entitled persons to copyright owners: all 
entrepreneurs using controlling technologies for their business (mostly broadcasters 
and other content providers) are entitled to seek injunctions and/or damages. This 
means that even a non-exclusive licensee (distributor) of copyrighted works, who is 
not entitled to exercise copyright, can assert and enforce protections toward 
circumventing devices under the UCPL. 
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The UCPL has only one statutory exemption for “testing and research.”53 The 
article is very simple. It states that to assign, transfer, display, export, import, or 
provide over the Internet the circumvention devices or programs “for the purpose of 
testing or research regarding technological protection measures” is exempt. There is no 
detailed limitation regarding the definition of “testing” and “research,” as is the case in 
the DMCA. The official commentary explains that the aim of the exemption statute is 
to ensure free and competitive activities targeted toward developing more sophisticated 
technological protection measures.54 The exemption is intended to include all of the 
following activities: testing and research done by the service providers alone, or 
together with device manufacturers for developing new technologies; testing and 
research for validity and vulnerability of technologies currently used in the service or 
to be used in the future service; and testing and research done by content owners to 
ensure the effectiveness of the protection measures, or comparing the pros and cons of 
the several technologies that may be applied to their content.55 
However, the commentary also explains that it was a deliberate decision of the 
 
53 Article 11 Paragraph 1 Item 7 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law of Japan.
54 See, Yoshida et al., supra note 30 at 252-253. 
55 Id. 
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legislators not to have any other statutory exemption.56 With regard to exemptions for 
law enforcement or other government activities, the legislators decided them 
unnecessary because circumvention devices provided for such purposes cannot be 
regarded as “unfair competition” and, therefore, are not regulated under the UCPL in 
the first place. The legislators also talked about creating a statutory exemption to 
respect the copyright limitation statutes, but they finally decided not to. Their reasons 
were: (a) circumvention devices could create considerable economic loss to content 
owners if misused, and (b) legitimate and acceptable uses would not be regulated 
under the UCPL because such uses would not cause “commercial damages” large 
enough to be regulated under the UCPL. 
3.1.2.2 Difference between the U.S. and Japan 
In terms of regulated devices and information, anti-device regulation is broader in 
Japan than in the U.S. in two aspects. First, although limited to commercially based 
activities, technological protection measures are protected even when applied to the 
public domain under the UCPL in Japan. However, this difference does not make a 
large difference in practice, because, in most cases, the same technologies would be 
used to protect copyrighted as well as public domain works, and it is very hard to 
 
56 Id. at 253 footnote 25. 
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imagine a device that circumvents technologies only when protected works are in the 
public domain, given the current situation where there is no systematic ways to mark 
the difference between the public domain and copyrighted works. Therefore, the 
devices that are regulated under the UCPL in Japan would probably be also regulated 
under the anti-device regulations in the U.S. 
Second, Japanese anti-device regulations have a broader scope of regulation in 
terms of persons entitled to the claim, i.e., the UCPL protects content providers (or 
licensees and distributors) in addition to copyright owners, while in the U.S., it 
protects only copyright owners. 
On the other hand, there are several points where the U.S. anti-device regulations 
seem to be broader. First, both copyright law and the UCPL in Japan limit controlled 
devices to those whose “principal function” is to circumvent protection measures. In 
the U.S., devices that have “only limited commercially significant purpose for use 
other than” circumvention are also regulated, which is tailored in a broader manner 
than in Japan. 
In the U.S., some cases ruled that anti-device regulations are even applicable to 
devices that have several different functions, one being “only limited commercially 
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significant purpose for use other than” circumvention, but others being legitimate.57 
Even though this issue has not yet been heavily tested in front of the court, if this trend 
continues, there may be a clear difference in scope of anti-device regulations between 
the U.S. and Japan. Though not yet ruled by the courts, if the requirement of the 
“principal function” being circumvention of protection measures is interpreted as “no 
other significant functions,” multiple-functioned devices may be exempted under 
Japanese anti-device regulation. The answer remains to be seen at this point in time. 
Second, the regulated devices in the DMCA may cover a broader scope of tangible 
or intangible goods, or at least causes some ambiguities as to what kind of goods are 
regulated. As described below,58 the RIAA once alleged that even an academic paper 
discussing a security hole regarding watermarks can be a “technology” regulated under 
the anti-device regulations in the U.S. This would not happen in Japan, as both 
copyright law and the UCPL make it clear that they regulate tangible devices or their 
 
57 See, RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, 22-23 (D. Wash. 2000) 
(quoting Nimmer & Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (1999 Supp.), 12A.18[B], stating that “a given 
piece of machinery might qualify as a stable item of commerce, with a substantial noninfringing use, 
and hence be immune from attack under Sony's construction of the Copyright Act- but nonetheless still 
be subject to suppression under Section 1201.”); followed by Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., 
Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1037 (D. Ill. 2003) (“Indeed, in the RealNetworks case, the court was 
presented with a product that had both a legitimate purpose and also functioned as a means to 
circumvent the plaintiff's protective measures. The RealNetworks court found that the portion of the 
product that circumvented the protective measure was enough to violate the DMCA.). This 
interpretation is also supported by Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F. 3d 1178, 1198 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), although given a different fact, they concluded differently. 
58 See, Felton case described in infra Section 3.3.2. 
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parts and computer software, thereby avoiding some chilling effects. 
Third, under the DMCA, manufacturing even a single device can be illegal. In 
addition, statutory exemptions are very narrowly defined. On the other hand, under 
Japanese copyright law, anti-device regulations prohibit only activities targeted toward 
the public. This means that, under Japanese copyright law, a hacker (whether a good 
researcher or a bad pirate) can do their “research” and try to develop and design a 
device that circumvents DRM technologies without permission, as long as the hacker 
does not engage in mass-scale activities. This would explain why Japanese copyright 
law does not have exemptions for scientific research, security testing, or other 
legitimate activities. The UCPL, on the other hand, regulates distribution of a single 
device as long as such distribution is made for commercial purposes. However, the 
UCPL has a broad, general exemption statute that includes almost all kinds of “testing 
and research” regarding technological protection measures. Therefore, Japan is overall 
friendly to scientific research. 
3.1.3 Copyright Management Information Regulation 
Another regulation that legally supports technological controlling measures is the 
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“copyright management information (‘CMI’) regulation.”59 The CMI regulation is 
also an implementation of the requirement of the 1996 WIPO Treaties.60 
Metadata, such as terms and conditions of use and information about copyright 
owners, are protected under the CMI regulation. Included are metadata written in REL 
and other contractual languages used in DRM systems. 
The scope of CMI regulations in the U.S.61 and in Japan62 are similar. In addition 
to the obligations set forth in the WIPO Treaties, both the DMCA and Copyright Law 
of Japan prohibit people from providing false CMI.63 
As there are not any distinct cases that have tested CMI regulations in either the 
U.S. or Japan, it is rather difficult to determine the real scope of the regulations. 
However, because CMI regulations prohibit changing metadata, including REL 
descriptions, and because REL is one of the major components of the DRM 
technologies, CMI regulations can have almost the same impact as the rest of the 
anti-circumvention regulations. 
3.2 Pros of Anti-circumvention Regulations 
 
59 17 U.S.C. §1202, Article 2 Paragraph 1 Item 21 and Article 113 Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Copyright 
Law. 
60 WCT Article 12 and WPPT Article 19. 
61 17 U.S.C. §1202. 
62 Article 2 Paragraph 1 Item 21 and Article 113 Paragraphs 3, 4 of the Copyright Law. 
63 17 U.S.C. §1202(a), Article 113 Paragraph 3 Item 1 of the Copyright Law. 
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The merit of anti-circumvention regulations is that they can add protection to the 
DRM technologies as business enablers. As Nobuhiro Nakayama points out, for 
example, every DRM technology is destined to be broken, and, in practice, given the 
acceptable cost to be spent on DRM technologies from a business perspective, content 
providers often have to put up with DRM technologies that are not strong enough.64 
Therefore, he concludes that providing legal protection to DRM technologies is 
necessary for the growth of a “healthy” information society.65 
It also helps add deterrence to break DRM technologies with the intention of 
pirating copyrighted works. To form this point slightly differently, it may help 
right-holders to release more content in a digital form by providing additional 
protections. For example, Shiburo Tokano, Manager of the Musical Copyright Section 
of the Intellectual Property Division at Yamaha, states that technological protection 
measures and deterrence added by anti-circumvention regulations are very important 
for ring-tone providers, as the data of ring-tones are very small and easily distributed.66 
3.3 Cons of Anti-circumvention Regulations 
3.3.1 Impact on Overriding Problems: Fixing problems created by DRM 
 
64 See, Yoshida et al., supra note 30 at ii. 
65 Id. 
66 Interview with Yoichi Misawa, Assistant Manager, Yamaha, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 24, 2002). 
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Technologies 
However, anti-circumvention regulations, both in the U.S. and Japan, are also 
causing problems by fixing the problem DRM technologies are causing by blindly 
protecting any kind of DRM systems/designs. 
For example, the Second Circuit declared in the Corley case that circumventing 
DRM technologies even for the purpose of fair use is not permissible under the 
DMCA.67 This means that the DMCA is fixing the problem of diminishing the benefit 
of or adding cost to fair use. Realizing that copyrighted works with analog output can 
be recaptured and used, the Second Circuit states that “the DMCA does not impose 
even an arguable limitation on the opportunity to make a variety of traditional fair 
uses.”68 However, Corley does not refer to cases where analog output is not available, 
such as use of computer software codes.  
In Japan, the problem of overriding some freedoms is less problematic, as 
circumvention is allowed under copyright law if it is made for the purpose of uses 
exempted by law. However, this “freedom to hack” is helpful only for technologically 
savvy people who have enough knowledge and skills to circumvent DRM technologies. 
 
67 273 F. 3d. at 443. 
68 Id. at 459. 
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Those who are not technologically savvy need to have a tool to make the necessary 
circumvention. Therefore, the anti-device regulations create unfairness between the 
technologically savvy and non-savvy.69 
3.3.2 Impact on Scientific Research: Chilling Effect 
In the U.S., anti-circumvention regulations can create a chilling effect on scientific 
research, especially in the field of security research. This is because the basic manner 
of security research is for researchers to investigate security problems, discuss them 
among themselves, write code to fix the problems, and test and challenge such codes 
with each other.70 If the circumvention itself is generally prohibited, they are not able 
to do research.  
Because in the DMCA the statutory exemption for conducting research is narrowly 
tailored, it has been claimed that it causes a chilling effect.71 The famous case is the 
“Felten” Case, where Princeton Professor Edward Felten once withdrew from 
presenting his paper about the security hole because of a threat based on the DMCA.72 
69 Benkler, supra note 18 at 416. 
70 See, Brief of Amici Curiae of S. Bellovin, M. Blaze, D. Boneh, D. Del Tronto, I. Goldberg, B. 
Schneier, F. A. Stevenson, D. Wagner, in Corley, 26 January 2001, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/crypto-amicus.html, (last visited April 25, 2006). 
71 For example, Niels Ferguson, a Dutch cryptographer, declared that he would not publish his article 
regarding the security weaknesses of a cryptographic system due to his fear of violating the DMCA. See,
Niels Ferguson, Censorship in Action: Why I don’t Publish My HDCP Results, August 15, 2001, 
http://www.macfergus.com/niels/dmca/cia.html,(last visited April 25, 2006). 
72 Felten, et al., v. RIAA, et al., No. CV-01-2669 (D.N.J.,2001). See, 
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Carter Laren, Senior Security Architect at Cryptography Research, describes the 
chilling effect created in the field of security research as follows. 
I understand the motivation behind [the DMCA]. I understand that 
studios don’t want their content stolen, and I agree that content 
shouldn’t be stolen. 
 
However, DMCA is actually bad for security. The reason for this is: 
DMCA makes it illegal to build bypass equipment, for example. Of 
course, they have carve outs for research and those kind of things, so 
you are supposed to be able to do it for these reasons anyway, but 
working for a security company, let me tell you, that has scared us away. 
No one wants to test that. 
 
We used to, before DMCA, break things all the time. We wouldn’t 
release them publicly, but we would get things in, evaluate them, find 
the security faults, and figure out how to be able to fix them or what 
people are doing security-wise, and that was generally good for security. 
Security works by people breaking stuff. That’s how the industry works, 
and if you look at the publications from the cryptography conferences, I 
pick up any of these books and you’ll see people breaking algorithms, 
and someone else introducing a new algorithm in the same book and 
that goes on constantly. That’s how we’ve worked as a community. 
DMCA has been bad from that perspective; it does stifle research 
regardless of the intent. We were not surprised by [the Felten case when 
it happened].73 
3.3.3 Impact on Developments of Devices, Services, and Software 
In the U.S., because of the narrowness of the exemptions for reverse engineering, 
 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/(last visited April 25, 2006). 
73 Interview with Carter Laren, Senior Security Architect, Cryptography Research, in San Francisco, 
Cal. (Apr. 8, 2005). 
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encryption research, and security testing, it has become much more difficult to design 
new devices or new services that require reverse engineering, testing, and research 
without being chilled by the DMCA.  
Also, in both the U.S. and Japan, it has become even more difficult to provide 
devices or services that provide interoperability with DRM-protected devices or 
services. Even a device provider who provided transmitters for a garage-door opener 
was sued under the DMCA.74 Without having permission from either DRM providers 
or copyright holders, it is almost impossible to provide interoperability under the 
current regulations, except for the very narrow exemption of §1201 (f) in the U.S. 
In addition, anti-circumvention regulations have a huge impact on software 
development. For example, in the U.S., a Russian programmer, Dmitry Sklyarov, was 
arrested and jailed on a charge of a DMCA violation in 2001, because he was alleged 
to have been involved in creating a software program that allows circumventing some 
restrictions on Adobe electronic books.75 
These restrictions generally have an impact on competition and innovation, as has 
 
74 Chamberlain, 381 F. 3d at 1192. 
75 See, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Seven Years Under the DMCA, 4
(2006), http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/DMCA_unintended_v4.pdf (last visited April 25, 2006). 
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already been pointed out.76 
3.3.4 Risk of Abuse by Right Owners and the State 
The fundamental difference between anti-circumvention regulations, especially 
anti-device regulations and the traditional copyright law, is that anti-device regulations 
outlaw the technologies themselves rather than a particular use of the technologies.77 
Carter Laren describes his fear of the abuse of such regulations: 
One of the things that bothers me about this idea of legislation designed 
to outlaw technology is: it’s a principle that is more widely applicable 
than to just [stop piracy]. You can start applying it to anything that you 
think is immoral or wrong….78 
Laren elaborates his fear, which is based on the danger of misusing a broad regulation. 
I heard a lecture from an FBI cyber squad a couple of years ago.… [H]e 
made this argument that they needed laws that outlaw these various 
pieces of technology, because the more they could nail someone on, the 
more violations they could get, which is better. ... The populace should 
trust the FBI to not misuse those… Don’t worry, just make it illegal and 
we would only go after the people that really deserve to have this 
happen to them. 
 
76 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 
(Random House, 2001); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1345 (2004); A. Picot and M. Fiedler, 
Impacts of DRM on Internet Based Innovation, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, at 288 (2003). For a 
critical review, see, Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, innovation, and intellectual property policy, 103 
Colum. L. Rev. 534 (2003). For the relationship of access control and innovation in the European 
context, see Thomas Heide, Access control and innovation under the emerging EU electronic commerce 
framework, 15 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 993 (2000). 
77 For criticisms toward too broad anti-device regulations, see, Alfred C. Yen, What Federal Gun 
Control Can Teach Us About the DMCA's Anti-Trafficking Provisions, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 649 (2003) 
78 Interview with Carter Laren, Senior Security Architect, Cryptography Research, in San Francisco, 
Cal. (Apr. 8, 2005). 
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Well, great, but there’s no guarantee that they are going after only bad 
people, and the government has a history of expanding their powers and 
doing bad things for years… So, from a philosophic standpoint, I really 
dislike legislation that tries to limit technology in various ways.79 
As Laren points out, the police power of the government is in question of abusing the 
statute in criminal cases. In civil cases, it is a private party that could abuse the 
regulations. There are already a couple of lawsuits based on the DMCA that can be 
seen as an issue of fair competition rather than of protecting copyrighted materials in 
the U.S.80 It is not surprising that right-holders try to exercise their rights to have a 
better position in the market. In the future, even an antitrust guideline might be 
necessary for exercising rights regarding anti-circumvention regulations, as it is now 
regarding patents and other intellectual property law.81 
3.4 Revisiting the Rationale Behind Anti-circumvention Regulations 
Given the pros and cons described above, it is useful to ask whether any part of the 
anti-circumvention regulations should be re-examined, especially when its cons 
 
79 Id. 
80 See, Chamberlain, 381 F. 3d 1178; Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F. 3d 
522 (6th Cir. 2004); rehearing denied by: Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 2004 
U.S. App. LEXIS 27422 (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 2004); rehearing, en banc, denied by: Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3330 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2005). See, also, Daniel 
C. Higgs, Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. & Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. 
Skylink Technologies, Inc.: The DMCA and Durable Goods Aftermarkets, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 59 
(2004). 
81 For the U.S. guideline, see, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm,(last visited April 
25 2006). For the Japanese guideline, see, http://hrsk.jftc.go.jp/dk/View_HTML.asp, (last visited April 
26, 2006). 
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overweighs its pros. Although the concrete legal proposal of how the 
anti-circumvention regulations can be revised is discussed in Section 5 below, it is 
helpful to revisit the rationale behind the regulations here to see that legal protection 
over DRM technologies may not be the ultimate solution for stopping piracy and 
sustaining content business in the digital and network environment. 
3.4.1 Business Can Be Made with Broken DRM Technologies 
If prohibiting circumvention of DRM technologies is for the purpose of enabling 
content transaction, a question can be posed about its necessity, given the fact that 
even a broken technological protection measure can successfully enable a content 
business model. 
This point is clearly shown by the example of DVD. Content Scramble System 
(“CSS”), a software mechanism that tries to stop illegal access and reproduction of 
content in DVD discs, was broken and made possible to circumvent using the software 
called DeCSS. Regardless of several lawsuits,82 DeCSS is still widely available over 
the Internet.83 Still, the DVD business is a profitable business for motion picture 
 
82 E.g., Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.N.D.Y. 2000); Corley, 273 F. 3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).  
83 For example, a Webpage called “DeCSS Central” has a link to DeCSS software, 
http://www.lemuria.org/DeCSS/decss.html, (last visited April 25, 2006). 
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industries and sales have continued to grow every year in both the U.S. and Japan.84 
This example suggests that, having complete security may not be as necessary to 
sustain businesses as it is often claimed, even in the age of digital and network 
technologies. Also, the necessity of giving legal protection is not inevitable to sustain 
content business. It is rather a policy question of which is better for a society as a 
whole by comparing its marginal deterrence added by anti-circumvention regulations 
(note that right-holders already have traditional copyright to punish piracy as a result 
of circumvention) and their negative impact on societies.85 
3.4.2 Outlawing Circumvention of DRM Technologies Does Not Practically Stop 
Piracy 
It is very ironic that the anti-circumvention regulations, which try to ensure that 
content is securely protected by DRM technologies, are strongly criticized by security 
experts. Carter Laren,86 Senior Security Architect at Cryptography Research,87 claims 
 
84 See, for general information, DVD Demystified, DVD Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.dvddemystified.com/dvdfaq.html#1.9,(last visited April 25, 2006). In Japan, the gross sales 
of DVDs have grown every year. For example, the number of retail sales of DVD software has grown as 
follows: 2.1 million (1998), 7.9 million (1999), 26.8 million (2000), 40.6 million (2001), 53.7 million 
(2002), 69.4 million (2003), 83.2 million (2004). See, “Annual Statistics of Sales and Rentals,” 
http://www.jva-net.or.jp/jva/data/toukei.pdf, (last visited April 25, 2006). 
85 For possible pros and cons of anti-circumvention regulations, see supra Section 3.2 and 3.3. However, 
the final answer to this policy question should be based on an empirical analysis of whether the positive 
or negative effects outweigh the other, which is outside the scope of this research. 
86 Carter Laren did graduate work at the University of Pennsylvania in the Electronics Engineering 
Department. He has experience in designing secure communication system for the military. His role in 
Cryptography Research is to help design and implement Pay TV security technologies. Currently, he is 
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that anti-circumvention does not help solve the security side of the technological 
problem, especially in the long run. He understands that the basic idea behind the 
anti-circumvention regulations is to make the transaction fair. As Jeffery Lawrence at 
Intel says, “if there is naked content next to protected content, no one is going to buy 
the protected content.”88 Still, Laren believes that such legislation cannot practically 
stop those who want to hack technologies. As Laren says: 
You cannot [stop them]. You can make [circumvention] software 
available by download from anywhere in the world, [and] there’re 
jurisdictional issues…. Even though DeCSS is totally illegal, someone 
has a server that’s in the Bahamas that has DeCSS and you can 
download it. If they try and put filters on it, [in order] to filter and see 
you’re getting DeCSS, they will encrypt it and give you a key. And 
you’ll download it and decrypt it.… There’s always a way to get around 
this kind of stuff. 89 
Therefore, according to Laren, prohibiting circumvention of technological protection 
measures by law does not solve the problem in a substantial way. Of course, it is true 
 
in charge of building high definition optical disks, and is heavily involved with efforts to make them 
secure. 
87 Cryptography Research is a 10-year-old cryptography research company founded by Paul Kocher, an 
expert in the U.S. cryptography community. The company deals primarily with the implementation of 
cryptography in the social system, such as Pay TV services, credit cards, and coming high definition 
optical media by consulting, analyzing the systems, anticipating attacks on their security systems, and 
coming up with counter measures, such as re-designing the system, among others. Recently, they spent 
several years thinking about optical media. In the late 1990s, they concluded that DVD was clearly bad 
from a cryptographic point of view, although it was a successful business model. They started their 
project by thinking what they would do if they had had a chance to redesign the DVD security 
mechanisms. They spent couple of million dollars on research, which led to their involvement in the 
discussion of the security design high definition optical disks. 
88 Interview with Jeffery Lawrence, Attorney, Intel, in Hillsboro, OR. (Aug. 14, 2003). 
89 Interview with Carter Laren, Senior Security Architect, Cryptography Research, in San Francisco, 
Cal. (Apr. 8, 2005). 
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in every case that having an enforceable law does not completely stop illegal actions. It 
is also true that outlawing some action may serve as a deterrent to some extent. 
However, given the impracticality to stop circumvention, Laren points out that the 
effect of outlawing circumvention does more harm than good, as it chills the 
“good-minded hackers”, i.e., security researchers who find security holes earlier than 
bad-minded hackers, who often do not care about the risks of breaking the law.90 
3.4.3 DRM Technologies Are Not the Final Solution to the Piracy Problem 
In addition, anti-circumvention regulations that legally protect DRM technologies 
also may not be as efficient for reducing mass-scale piracy as people expect, because 
DRM technologies are not the final solution to the problem of piracy. 
The problem of piracy fundamentally exists in the evil minds of those who steal 
content, not in the incompleteness of technological security. However secure the DRM 
technologies are, they can be broken if one spends enough time and money. And even 
more importantly, the protected content should be able to be played and exploited by 
“customers” who purchased the content, and such “customers” can be the largest 
security hole in a distribution chain. 
Carter Laren discusses this point in detail. First, he says that DRM technologies 
 
90 See, supra Section 3.3.2. 
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cannot cure the piracy problem. 
The interesting thing is that, a lot of people that are not cryptographers, 
that are not security experts, have this idea that cryptography is really 
good for fixing their problems [of piracy].91 
As Laren elaborates, he first explains the primary purpose of security technologies. 
[Given my background of serving as a security expert in the U.S. 
military,] let me explain why cryptography is not really enough to solve 
the problem here. Cryptography is designed for a very different 
problem: and that problem primarily is one of secure communications. 
If I’m a trusted party and you are a trusted party, we both trust each 
other, we know each other. Let’s say we are both generals in the military. 
And we want to speak some secrets to each other, but we don’t want a 
third party to eavesdrop or change our conversation. Cryptography is 
great at solving that problem.… We can see that the data is encrypted, 
and there are a lot of great security statements that you can make about 
the fact that if someone is listening in the middle, they can’t change 
anything or eavesdrop. So, in military systems, cryptography is very 
important.92 
However, as Laren says, the piracy problem is different from the secure 
communication problem. He elaborates: 
If you look at the problem of piracy, it’s not a secure communications 
problem at all. Piracy is a totally different problem, which is: I own 
some content, I trust you, and I want to let you see the content, so I am 
going to give it to you. But then after I trust you, you change your mind 
and become a traitor, and you share the content with someone else…. I 
can very easily send you content in a way that no one in between can 
get the content. But once you have it, cryptography doesn’t really help 
me control it in any way. And that’s really the problem with piracy. As a 
 
91 Interview with Carter Laren, Senior Security Architect, Cryptography Research, in San Francisco, 
Cal. (Apr. 8, 2005). 
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result, piracy becomes a lot messier to deal with, because it starts to turn 
into an engineering problem with practical limits, and you start to try to 
minimize [the risk] instead of get rid of it.93 
In sum, Carter emphasizes that the core of the “piracy” problem is essentially in the 
evil intention of people who first get the content as “customers,” and not the security 
of content delivery. It is very hard, especially in the mass content market, to 
distinguish good-minded customers who use the content as they are expected to, and 
ill-intentioned “customers” who then turn into pirates. And this characteristic can be 
applied not only to the cryptographic component of DRM technologies, but to other 
parts such as REL and watermarks. 
Given this fact, the role of DRM technologies, from a security point of view, is to 
increase the cost of piracy by making it difficult and costly rather than completely 
eliminate it. More secure DRM technologies make it harder for pirates with 
commercial intentions to build business on them, and at the same time, make it almost 
impossible for technologically non-savvy people to take out the content. If so, a 
solution to the problem of piracy that is effectively using DRM technologies, can be 




technologies (or architecture),94 which is described in the next Section. 
3.4.4 Problem of Piracy Can Be Solved Through Market and Technologies 
There is an approach other than legislation to solving the problem of piracy: using 
technology and the market. As it takes time and money to break technologies, the more 
secure the distribution infrastructure is, or, more precisely, the more costly it is to steal 
content, the less likely piracy will occur. If circumventing technologies costs more 
than the benefit derived from such circumvention, commercial hackers will not try to 
circumvent the technologies. Also, in the case of non-commercial hackers who take 
delight in the act of hacking itself, if the damage is small enough to sustain the 
business model, it could be handled as a manageable risk by the industries. 
Damage from piracy, from a business perspective, can be measured by the 
probability of circumventing the DRM technologies multiplied by the loss caused by 
such circumvention. Carter Laren explains: 
I am going to use an example of credit cards here, because fraud is 
similar to [piracy]. Anyone can just decide to be you, or they can steal 
your credit card and commit fraud pretty easily. The way Visa and 
Mastercard, for example, look at their risk is, they really view it in 
terms of the probability of attack times consequences of the attack. They 
know that the probability is sort of high, and they have to mitigate the 
 
94 As Lawrence Lessig points out, people’s behaviors can be regulated through any combination of the 
four factors: law, market, social norms and architecture (including technologies). See, LAWRENCE LESSIG,
CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 85-99 (Minneapolis: Sagebrush Education Resources 1999).  
43 
consequences, and they can try to reduce both parts of the equation if 
they want. But in order to do this, they really set up an infrastructure 
that allows them to do two major things: one is to detect when there are 
problems, and the other one is to respond to problems when they 
occur.95 
Then, Laren describes one possible business approach as an example, which tries to 
minimize both the damage of circumvention and the incentive to circumvent DRM 
technologies. First, Laren explains the mechanisms of commercial pirates. 
In our work with Pay TV companies, if you look at the people who are 
actually pirates (… I mean, people who are actually developing the 
attacks and selling them to consumers), those are generally organized 
crime…. They are usually willing to invest a large amount of 
non-recurring engineering costs to develop an attack, if they know that 
they can then use this attack again and again. 
 
So, in the pay TV space, for example, an organization will spend half a 
million to a million dollars to take a smart card, … [and the card would 
be] reverse engineered, and imaged. This is an expensive process, [but] 
they hire engineers to figure out exactly what it is doing, [and] reverse 
engineer all the code. They spend all this time and all this money, 
because, at the end of the day, they can produce a little box for $300 that 
they can sell over the Internet, that everyone would want, and … they 
make their money back pretty quickly. It’s a business to them.96 
Then, Laren suggests a possible solution through market mechanisms. 
One of the reasons that pirates can be successful is because they don’t 
have any recurring cost. A lot of these systems have got something like 
all these rules built into a smart card or built into a player…. Once [the 
pirates] attack them, all the content is subject to those rules, and that 
 
95 Interview with Carter Laren, Senior Security Architect, Cryptography Research, in San Francisco, 
Cal. (Apr. 8, 2005). 
96 Id. 
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attack works for everything. 
 
If you sort of turn this on its head and you require, instead of the player 
being smart, the content has to be smart. Now, you can invest all this 
energy in this piece of content, but you cannot leverage it, because [for] 
the next piece of content, you have to reinvest all your energy [to break 
new technologies]. It means that your game with pirates is now a little 
more equitable. It means, instead of them being able to do this one shot 
deal and you are done, they have to keep investing, which is always 
good [for content owners]. You are not going to stop piracy, but it’s 
always good to make it harder for them and force them into these 
different business models.97 
In sum, when you change technological protection measures on a content-by-content 
basis, for example, the gain from one case of circumvention is only one kind of content, 
which is far smaller than it is now. It will decrease the benefit, and thus the incentive 
for commercial pirates, to hack DRM technologies. It will also reduce the damage the 
content owner will suffer, even in the case of hackers without commercial intention. 
Nobuyuki Watanabe at NTT Docomo describes this “protection by market” from a 
different aspect. As Watanabe explains, there are very few problems regarding piracy 
in the content distribution services in the i-mode market, and, to a large extent, this is 
because a rational person would not try to hack the content. 
For persons with normal technical expertise, when they attempt to 
remove [content] from their handsets, they will end up breaking the 




whether breaking down a handset will pay, I don't think so. If the 
content were several tens of thousands of yen, it might be worthwhile 
obtaining the content even though the handset broke down, but … I 
think buying would be more reasonable at the cost of ¥100 or ¥300.98 
It may not be clear whether these kinds of approaches using market and 
technologies would be better in every. However, it would have been at least worth 
studying such a question before taking legal action. In this regard, Carter Laren asks 
why content owners rushed to legislative means without even trying to take a “market 
and architecture” approach. 
I think the reason why Hollywood is pushing [legislation that prohibits 
technology] more than other industries is because … they don’t know 
how to solve the problem any other way…. They have this problem; 
they don’t know about technology, they know about lobbying, so that’s 
what they are going to do: they jump on legislation.99 
As Lawrence Lessig explains, legal regulation is only one means of regulating 
people’s behavior, such as copyright infringement.100 There is no reason why they 
should opt for only legal means. If copyright owners want to avoid piracies caused by 
circumvention of DRM technologies, they can also seek other means than law, i.e., 
technologies and the market. Whether adding legal protection is good for the society 
and thus justified should be answered by comparing the pros and cons of the specific 
 
98 Interview with Nobuyuki Watanabe, NTT Docomo, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 11, 2002). 
99 Interview with Carter Laren, Senior Security Architect, Cryptography Research, in San Francisco, 
Cal. (Apr. 8, 2005). 
100 See, Lessig, supra note 94 at 87. 
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regulations, which is outside the scope of this research. However, it is useful to 
recognize that anti-circumvention regulations are not the only means to “fight with 
piracy.” 
4. Problem of Overriding Freedom (1): Can Market Solve the Problem? 
If not all, some of the override of freedom caused by DRM technologies and 
anti-circumvention regulations can be solved if the implementation of DRM 
technologies are well balanced.101 This Section explores whether the market can cure 
the problem of too strict implementation of DRM technologies.  
After presenting this question (4.1), this article describes the differences in legal 
standing between right owners and the users of copyrighted works as one of the 
background factors in the market negotiation regarding DRM implementation (4.2). 
Then, this article describes the actual market mechanisms of development and 
implementation of DRM technologies (4.3). It concludes with some analysis of 
whether the market really can solve the problem of strict implementation of DRM 
technologies (4.4). 
4.1 Problems of the Development and Implementation of DRM Technologies 
As described in Section 2, the two sources of overriding freedom within the 
 
101 See, supra Section 2.2.2.  
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copyright regime are (i) the manner of actual implementation of the DRM technologies, 
and (ii) the limitations caused by the differences in nature between computers and 
human beings. This research recognizes that it would be difficult in the short run to 
overcome the second problem. Therefore, this research focuses on the first issue: 
whether the market can fix the problem of too strict implementation of DRM 
technologies that overrides the freedom incorporated within the copyright regime.102 
Obviously, the rules of DRM implementation make a large difference in the market, 
both for content users and right-holders. A good and well-known example is Apple’s 
iTunes Music Store, launched in April 2003.103 Before the iTunes service, the rules set 
by online music stores were very strict and hardly allowed copies or transfers of 
content that users purchased. Sales by these online stores were very low, and the RIAA 
accused peer-to-peer file-sharing software as the major reason for the low sales.104 
However, after the launch of the iTunes Music Store, the recording industry is now 
convinced that people are willing to pay for the music they download.105 It may be 
 
102 For a discussion of whether DRM technologies can be freedom-friendly, see infra Section 5.1.2.1. 
103 See, Apple Computer Inc., Apple Launches the iTunes Music Store (Apr. 28, 2003), 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2003/apr/28musicstore.html (last visited April 25, 2006). 
104 See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff at 4, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186 (D. Cal. 2001) (No. C-99-5183 MHP), available at 
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/Napster/napster_brief.pdf (last visited April 26, 2006) (“the millions of illicit 
downloads that Napster enables and encourages are eroding the marketability of recorded music.”),. 
105 The iTunes Music Store sold over one million songs in its first week, reached to two million 
downloads in less than 20 days. In less than two months, the store hit five million downloads, and by the 
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that one of the most important reasons the iTunes Music Store became so successful is 
because of the relatively flexible usage rules they applied to songs purchased from 
them. Users can burn unlimited number of CDs, although a particular playlist can only 
be burned up to 7 times before the playlist must be changed. They can also transfer the 
purchased song up to five different computers, or wirelessly stream it to another 
computer or stereo.106 
Still, the trend of DRM technologies is to “manage and control” the usage of 
content. As Yoshisuke Kuroda, General Manager of the Planning Department, Network 
Application & Solutions Division, Sony Corporation, said in 2002: 
With current technological development, it will ultimately become 
possible to control from delivery of contents to the user end. One could, 
if one wanted, create a system which enables the content provider to 
obtain information indicating how many times or from when until when 
the user has played [content]. Accordingly, the technological trend is 
toward [control]. The problem is rather how to show [such control] to 
the user, or to what extent to allow the user [to use the content]…. Amid 
these trends, technological development has become important in order 
to have compatibility, from the standpoint of the user, to allow the user 
to do the same things he has done up to this point.107 
end of 2003, it had sold more than 25 million songs. Sales are still growing, and as of January 2005, 
Apple stated that their customers were downloading 1.25 million songs per day. Total downloads hit 300 
million in March, 2005. See, Apple Computer Inc.’s Press Release Library, 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/, (last visited April 25, 2006). 
106 For its usage rules, see, http://www.apple.com/itunes/overview/ (section called “Make it Your Own”), 
(last visited April 25, 2006). 
107 Interview with Yoshisuke Kuroda, General Manager, Sony, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 17, 2002). Note, 
however, that this is before the success of the iTunes Music Store, which might have affected his view 
later on. 
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In addition, even the DRM used in the Apple’s iTunes Music Store does not allow 
derivative uses or other uses that may be allowed under fair use or other copyright 
exemptions. 
If one puts the popularity of the iTunes Music Store and the technological trend of 
control together, a question arises: Why did DRM technologies begin to be 
implemented with strict usage rules, even though it was possible to implement them in 
a more flexible way? Why is it not popular in the market to implement DRM in a 
manner that is flexible enough to make it popular among consumers, or to respect the 
freedom allowed under copyright law? 
It is true that there are varieties of choices in how to implement DRM technologies. 
Chris Parkerson, DRM Evangelist at RSA Security, says that this problem may partly 
be solved by the market, as it finally comes down to the problem of a good business 
model. 
The technology exists to do whatever consumers want, or whatever 
Hollywood wants to do to protect their content. It just comes down to 
best practices.… But the best practices really haven’t arrived yet.108 
However, finding the “best practices” is not an easy job. In addition, “best 
practices” in the market may not mean that it reflects the freedom incorporated in the 
 
108 Interview with Chris Parkerson, DRM Evangelist, RSA Security, in L.A., Cal. (Mar. 31, 2005). 
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copyright regime. Therefore, it is interesting to look into the question of why DRM 
implementation tends to be favorable to right-holders. In the following, this section 
tries, based on interviews, to describe several factors that contribute to strict 
implementation of DRM technologies. It also tries to see whether the market can 
correct the problem of overriding freedom within the copyright regime, given the 
current legal regulations. 
4.2 Legal Entitlement 
The first issue to be pointed out is the difference in legal standing or entitlement 
between copyright owners and information users. This is important to notice, as the 
differences in legal standings appeared to have an impact on the power balance 
between copyright owners and users in the course of negotiations in the market, as 
described below.109 
As is obvious, copyright owners have a legal entitlement to decide how their works 
are used, as long as copyright law grants such rights. Therefore, as a natural and 
logical consequence of who has the final say on deciding the implementation rules of a 
particular DRM system, both right-holders and device manufacturers agree that it is 
the right-holders. Howie Singer at Warner Music states that “It is the content 
 
109 See, infra Section 4.4. 
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companies that decide what the usage rules are.”110 And so does Intel’s Jeffery 
Lawrence. To the question of who decides the actual usage rules of DRM, Lawrence 
answers, “It is the content provider. Because, under the copyright law, the law gives 
content providers the power to decide.”111 
On the other hand, the freedoms within the copyright law, such as fair use and 
other statutory exemptions, have been characterized as an “affirmative defense” in the 
U.S. copyright law.112 Thus, right-holders repeatedly claim that users of copyrighted 
works do not have a “right” to freely use copyrighted works, even with regard to uses 
that are exempted from copyright under the law.  
The legal landscape regarding “freedom” within a copyright regime is not so 
different in Japan. There has been some discussion about whether some of the statutory 
exemptions could be regarded as “rights” or “mandatory statutes” that could invalidate 
inconsistent agreement clauses, but the issue is still far from being settled. For example, 
 
110 Telephone Interview with Howie Singer, Vice President, Warner Music (Nov. 18, 2003). 
111 Interview with Jeffery Lawrence, Attorney, Intel, in Hillsboro, OR. (Aug. 14, 2003). 
112 It is usually said that fair use is an affirmative defense and not a right. See, e.g., Nimmer & Nimmer, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, Section 13.05 (LEXIS Publishing [Distributor], 2005). However, given the 
underlying values and its importance, there are also views to consider copyright exemptions as more 
than a mere defense. See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F. 3d 1532, 1542 n. 22 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(Birch, J.) (“Although the traditional approach is to view fair use as an affirmative defense, this writer, 
speaking only for himself, is of the opinion that it is better viewed as a right granted by the Copyright 
Act of 1976.”) See, also, supra note 15. For a freedom to read anonymously, see, Julie E. Cohen, A
Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at Copyright Management in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 
981 (1996).  
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Koizumi and Watanabe argue that the private copying statute does not grant an 
affirmative right and that users cannot, therefore, justify their violation of contracts or 
circumvention of DRM systems that eliminate private copying.113 
There is, therefore, an imbalance of power between the interests of the 
right-holders and the users, because the former are supported by legal entitlement, 
while the latter are not, even for uses that are exempted by the law and thus are 
legitimate. 
4.3 DRM Development Process and Power that Copyright Holders and Users 
Have in the Process 
Taking into account the imbalance of legal entitlement above, this section 
considers whether imbalanced DRM implementation could be cured through market 
processes. The considered factors are (a) how much copyright law impacts the process 
of DRM implementation (4.3.1), (b) de facto controlling power by right-holders 
arising from the process or procedure of DRM implementation (4.3.2), (c) relatively 
strict mind-set of right-holders (4.3.3), (d) tragedy of the anticommons that 
 
113 See, e.g. ???????????????????????????????[Naoki Koizumi, 
Digitalization and Information Contract—Electronic Contract, Technological Means and Copyright, 
Chizaiken, Forum Vol. 40, 50 (2002)] ???????? Vol. 40, page 50 (2000). See, also ????
?????????????????????????????????????????
[Tomoko Watanabe, Validity of Mass-market Information License Agreement—A Study from a Viewpoint 
of Copyright Law, Copyright ( March 2001) at 10,17. 
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right-holders suffer (4.3.4), and (e) relatively weak voices and power of users of 
copyrighted works in the market (4.3.5). 
4.3.1 Impact of Law in the Process of DRM Implementation 
The first question in focus is this: to what extent is the copyright law, especially the 
freedom within the copyright regime, considered and respected in the course of 
implementation? This question is important, because if the technologist who designs 
and implements DRM technologies does not pay attention to the balance within the 
copyright law, it is impossible for DRM technologies to embody the balance that 
copyright law incorporates. 
It is interesting to learn that law is not always the guideline that gives the final 
answer in the process. For example, answering the question of who determines how 
many copies of content are allowed in DRM-controlled devices, Noboru Tohyama, of 
the Legal Planning Department at Fujitsu, explained: 
The engineers determine the actual specifications. I don't think legal 
affairs is involved all that much. For example, it was the technical 
people who determined a DVD format. Legal affairs become involved 
in the case of contracts, but it is the technical people who determine 
things such as how many times check-out [of content] can be 
performed.114 
114 Interview with Noboru Tohyama, Legal Planning Department, Fujitsu, in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 22, 
2002). 
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In addition, many of the technical people who are deciding the actual conditions or 
usage terms of DRM technologies are not fully aware of copyright regulations, or, 
more precisely, the freedom incorporated within copyright law. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to find out that the consequences of the decisions made by such technical 
groups often do not reflect the “freedom” of users set forth in the copyright law. 
Of course, a few technologists are familiar with legal issues. Yoshisuke Kuroda at 
Sony says that he pays attention to copyright law all the time. 
Naturally, every country has its own laws, which must be obeyed 
absolutely. Areas not determined under the law … are determined by 
discussions with the content provider, and we introduce [new devices] 
in each country after such discussions.115 
As his background, Kuroda represented Sony several times in standard-setting 
discussions such as SDMI. Given his background, paying attention to legal regulations 
is nothing surprising, even as a technologist. 
However, having even a great deal of legal knowledge does not always guarantee a 
well-balanced DRM implementation. Specifically, device manufacturers and service 
providers who have sufficient legal knowledge are often very sensitive to issues related 
to their liabilities (including contributory and vicarious liability of users’ copyright 
infringement). For example, given the recent trend of increasing protection over 
 
115 Interview with Yoshisuke Kuroda, General Manager, Sony, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 17, 2002). 
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copyright holders in the U.S. courts, Masaya Otsuka, Senior Patent Manager of Sony 
Corporation’s Planning & Control Department, said that even Sony no longer relied on 
the Sony rulings regarding private copying. 
Within Sony, there is awareness that businesses that rely on statutes on 
private copying and Fair Use are now in danger. In the digital age, I 
don't believe the ruling in the Sony case will remain as it is for long. 
Accordingly, I believe that businesses that rely too much on statutes 
allowing private copying are in danger.116 
In sum, the insufficient legal knowledge of the people who actually decide the 
usage rules of DRM systems, and some chilling effect on those who are aware of the 
legal issues, results in a situation where freedom within copyright law may not be paid 
as much attention in the course of DRM implementation as legal scholars wish. 
4.3.2 Process and Procedure of DRM Development and Implementation 
4.3.2.1 Traditional Process and Procedure 
Several processes of technology implementation and market release of devices also 
shows how much power or influence the content owners have in the market of DRM 
technologies. Although the following are only a few examples, it can be said that 
content owners clearly have had some influence over device designs. 
 
116 Interview with Masaya Otsuka, Senior Patent Manager, Sony, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 17, 2002).As 
this interview was conducted before the ruling of Grokster, his view might be slightly influenced by the 
Grokster case. However, the point here is, that unclear legal changes regarding secondary liability could 
cause a chilling effect on device makers and service providers that know. 
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Yoshisuke Kuroda at Sony explains the custom of seeking consensus from the 
content owner about new devices that are released into the market. He made clear that 
before the release of products, the company brings the devices to industries that would 
have some interest in their release, and explains and negotiates laying the groundwork 
for the release. 
Such negotiations before product releases would certainly have some impact on the 
features device makers could add to their products. The amount of influence is not the 
same, however, in the PC and consumer electronics (CE) markets. In general, the CE 
industry is more influenced by this consensus-seeking process than the PC industry is. 
For example, regarding VAIO, personal computers designed by Sony, Kuroda 
admits that they always bring new VAIOs and explain the features to major 
right-holders. However, Kuroda says they do not always listen to what right-holders 
say. 
I think VAIOs are taking relatively various “adventurous” features. If 
you ask content holders, sometimes they say no, but there are times we 
just go ahead and release them. 
 
On the PC side, if we don’t offer something that other companies do 
offer, then from the users’ standpoint, a function is “lacking”, in which 
case the product won’t sell. For example, there was much debate inside 
Sony when we decided to add a CD-R burning function to VAIO, [but 
we decided to do so because we had to] in order to stay competitive in 
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the market.117 
Kuroda explains that such independence from content owners applies only to PCs, 
not to the CE or home electronics industries. The difference, Kuroda says, comes from 
the structural difference of the markets the devices are put in. 
The difference in culture between the PC and CE industries is a 
difference of perspective. The world of home electronics is one in which 
you cannot do business without content. The PC world has the 
advantage that it is not really necessary to listen to music [using a PC]. 
Recently, it is becoming so that content is important for the PC as well. 
But the difference remains between whether having content is an 
absolute necessity or just “one of them.”118 
Bruce Polichar, former Vice President of the Entertainment Department at IBM, 
agrees with Kuroda’s point. Polichar elaborates the willingness of the CE industry to 
be more accommodating to right-holders, from the viewpoint of recouping research 
and development (“R&D”) costs that they have already invested. First, Polichar points 
out that the risks of developing new distribution technologies are always on the side of 
technology companies. 
In almost every era of the entertainment business history, the 
entertainment companies have demanded that the technology companies 
take all of the R&D risks. The entertainment companies are always slow 
to make industry-wide choices about which technologies they want to 
endorse.119 
117 Interview with Yoshisuke Kuroda, General Manager, Sony, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 17, 2002). 
118 Id.
119 E-mail from Bruce Polichar, Former Vice President, IBM, to the author (Nov. 6, 2003, 09:45:24 
PST) (on file with author). 
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Given such R&D risks, Polichar says that CE companies have an incentive to make the 
device successful in the market, which often results in accommodating right-holders. 
[CE companies] want to hear from the entertainment companies about 
what kind of new delivery systems could build new sales of 
entertainment content. But in most cases, they have already been 
working on new devices in their R&D labs by the time they start 
discussions with the entertainment companies. Then they take the new 
devices to the entertainment industry seeking its endorsement of the 
new devices… 
 
In other words, while the CE company is trying to achieve acceptance 
of a new device, it needs the blessings of the content owners. It needs 
the content owners to say they will release content on the new device. 
The CE companies are often willing to give very favorable 
compensation to the entertainment companies in order to get content for 
the new device.120 
For example, in order for DVD players to sell well in the market, the market also has 
to have a variety of DVD disk titles available. Therefore, in order to convince content 
owners to release the content in their format, the format has to be favorable to the 
content owners. 
In addition, Bruce Polichar maintains that this process matches the interests of 
content holders. 
The entertainment companies often fear that if they do not negotiate 
licensing deals with the CE companies early in the development process 
…, they will not be able to negotiate favorable deals once the device has 
 
120 E-mail from Bruce Polichar, Former Vice President, IBM, to the author (Nov. 10, 2003, 09:34:26 
PST) (on file with author). 
59 
become a standard.121 
Toru Maruhashi and Noboru Tohyama at Fujitsu agree with Polichar’s point. They 
explained their dilemma when they released DVD players. Answering the question of 
whose convenience they consider in determining the specifications of DVD devices, 
Maruhashi and Tohyama said: 
(Maruhashi) It also varies according to the device. Since portable music 
delivery uses a complex system such as certification authorities, one 
also has to consider the side of operating the certification authorities. 
With a standalone device such as a DVD player, the sale of devices has 
more priority, so they pay more attention to the content holders. 
 
(Tohyama) When DVDs were first started, we went straight to 
Hollywood to ask about the format, not to the users or the sales outlets. 
 
(Maruhashi) That's true, but actually we would like to sell devices 
without going to Hollywood, if possible. Still, the idea was that, without 
any content to sell, one cannot sell players either. 
 
(Tohyama) That's why DRM does exactly what Hollywood says.122 
In sum, especially in the CE industry, there is a history of seeking the consent or 
blessing of the content holders, which often results in the implementation of favorable 
DRM rules. In the PC industry, such influence by right-holders seems to have been 
less in the past, which may be changing as described in the next Section. 
4.3.2.2 Growing Influence of Copyright Holders in the Digital and Network 
 
121 Id. 
122 Interview with Toru Maruhashi and Noboru Tohyama, Fujitsu, in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 22, 2002). 
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Environment 
The influence of content owners over technological design seems to be growing in 
the broadband era, as the presence of entertainment content such as music, motion 
pictures, or books in electronic form is growing in daily lives. As these entertainments 
leave the tangible packages and started to be delivered online, the influence of content 
owners is expanding to many areas other than CE industry, such as PC industries and 
online distribution services. 
For example, Bruce Polichar says the situation described above regarding CE 
companies is starting to expand to “the computer companies who are making more and 
more devices that are used for entertainment.”123 
Ron Bell, an attorney who supervises the licensing contracts and services at 
Yahoo’s Legal Department, says the following: 
Copyright policy is a mix of content-provider friendly and user friendly. 
But I would put a measure of this probably more on content-provider 
friendly…. Some of the advocates are way in favor of consumers, and 
content providers are more on the DRM side of the defense, and Yahoo 
tries to strike a balance because we do both. Probably we are now a bit 
friendlier to the content providers, because we create content and we 
manage content, and we have contracts and restrictions and laws that we 
have to pay attention to.124 
123 E-mail from Bruce Polichar, Former Vice President, IBM, to the author (Nov. 10, 2003, 09:34:26 
PST) (on file with author). 
124 Interview with Ron Bell, Yahoo, in Sunnyvale, Cal. (Jul. 9, 2003). 
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Another example in the field of online service is Musicmatch,125 a more focused 
content-distribution service online. Online content-distribution businesses in particular 
have to convince content owners in order to set up their business, just as the CE 
industry needs to have the blessing of the content owners. For this reason, when 
obtaining licenses, online service providers tend to have less bargaining power than 
right-holders, who are backed up by their legal entitlements as copyright. 
First, Bob Ohlweiler, Senior Vice President of Business Development at 
Musicmatch, describes the long history of their struggle in starting up their music 
store: 
Unfortunately, the download music business did not develop because 
the license from the music labels was not good enough to build business 
on. So, we had to stay [out of the distribution] business for a number of 
years…. At the end of 2003, Universal [Music] primarily, started to 
open up their mind toward to the download business. They started 
clearing rights for digital distributions with artists, and [provided with] 
reasonable licensing terms. Apple succeeded to convince several music 
labels to have reasonable licenses and was a big hit. That led us to do 
the download business at last,... 8 years [after starting the company].126 
He then explains that, after starting the business, their heavy dependency upon 
copyright influenced the usage rules of DRM technologies. 
The way the DRM market works is that the DRM technology 
 
125 Musicmatch is a Windows-based online music store. See, Musicmatch Homepage, 
http://www.musicmatch.com/, (last visited April 25, 2006). 
126 Telephone Interview with Bob Ohlweiler, Senior Vice President, Musicmatch (Nov. 19, 2003). 
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companies go to the content owners (music and movies) and get 
approvals or permissions from content companies that their DRM offers 
sufficient protection for people to use their content. If I went to 
Universal Music and said I wanted to use this technology that they think 
is too loose, they would say “No, you can’t. Use something with higher 
standards.” This is the first thing. Content owners generally approve 
what their partners use to distribute their contents. The second is that the 
content companies own the usage models because that’s their product, 
so they defined how their content is used.127 
Toru Maruhashi at Fujitsu admits this increasing influence of content owners in the 
online world. Maruhashi states that “[f]rom infrastructure providers, content holders to 
content providers, there is no incentive whatsoever to consider the freedom [of the 
users].”128 
It is not only online distribution services where the influence of right-holders 
increases. The development of devices is not independent from such growing influence. 
Answering the question of whose convenience is considered in determining the 
specifications of DRM technologies installed into devices, Toru Maruhashi at Fujitsu 
says: 
Our company wants to take various people into consideration, but when 
one talks with the people who are accomplishing technological 
development, they begin from the idea of having the content providers 
purchase their technologies. While, in the end, they think about matters 
such as ‘how many times check-out can be performed’ [from the users’ 
point of view]. But they first consider how to appeal to the people who 
 
127 Id.
128 Interview with Toru Maruhashi, Fujitsu, in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 22, 2002). 
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deliver content to them.129 
The same tendency can be observed in the DRM technology providers. As Jeffery 
Lawrence at Intel says: 
If you talk with DRM solution providers, they just provide the 
technologies to the content providers to allow them to offer whatever 
they want, because they are not in the policy call; that’s not their 
business. That’s true for all the DRM stuff. 
 
Now we are starting the high definition tools. [Many players in the 
market] need content for that. That is why you probably hear more 
people paying more attention to the content providers. And I don’t know 
how to change that, except that you come up with a good technology 
and get some bargaining power.130 
4.3.3 Mindset of Right Holders 
If the influence of the content owners is growing, and if they legally have the final 
word for the actual usage terms implemented in the system, the question worth 
studying is the mindset of content owners: i.e., how strictly content owners want the 
DRM technologies to be implemented? 
In the following, this research points out five characteristics of the content owners’ 
mindset as well as their obligations as commercial entities. 
4.3.3.1 Fear of the Online World 
The first to point out is the fear content holders have toward digital and network 
 
129 Id.
130 Interview with Jeffery Lawrence, Attorney, Intel, in Hillsboro, OR. (Aug. 14, 2003). 
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technologies. As Bruce Polichar explains, content owners have almost always been 
somewhat afraid of the new technologies. 
In the case of the entertainment industry, every single period of growth 
in the industry has been driven by technological innovations. This has 
been true for about 100 years. Think about it: the motion picture camera, 
film projection, color and sound in film, television broadcasting, long 
playing phonograph records, digital audio, video cassettes, etc. All have 
represented growth of the entertainment economy and all are based on 
new technologies at the time. 
 
However, in every period of technological innovation, the media 
companies have been suspicious and fearful of the new technologies 
and the people who are offering them. They are worried that these 
technology providers will own the solution and develop control over the 
entertainment companies’ business by owning the technologies critical 
to growth of the industry.131 
Recent technological changes brought by digital and network technologies are not 
exceptions: the fear of content holders toward digital network technologies was 
outstanding. This fear is very well represented in the U.S. by efforts to generate new 
copyright legislation, and the spate of lawsuits in the recent RIAA and MPAA 
campaigns.132 
131 E-mail from Bruce Polichar, Former Vice President, IBM, to the author (Nov. 6, 2003, 09:45:24 
PST) (on file with author). 
132 The efforts to legislate anti-circumvention regulations, for example, finally involved the WIPO after 
their first legislative attempt failed in the U.S. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP:
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 90-92 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 
2004). Mark S. Torpoco, Mickey and the Mouse: The Motion Picture and Television Industry’s 
Copyright concerns on the Internet, 5 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 1, 50-65.. Also, many cases challenged new 
distribution models based on digital and network technologies. See, e.g., RealNetworks, Inc. v. 
Streambox, Inc., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y., 2000), A&M 
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Because the dominant fear is that their content may be widely distributed in a 
digital form over the network, especially peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks, the 
main target of their concern is the digital output of devices. As one executive from a 
major media company and motion picture studio in the U.S. describes this point: 
There are some relatively simple initial licensing decisions that we can 
make. If somebody came to us with a device that allows someone to 
purchase a video online and download it to a device that has no outputs, 
it would be relatively easy for us to get into business conversations, 
because … it is clear that no copies will be made from the device. 
 
If there is an analog output, it’s a little more difficult, because a 
consumer could now copy to, say a VCR, and then to other devices that 
have analog or digital outputs. But the copy would not be the highest 
quality and even this is not that far outside the reasonable environment 
that we have been in. 
 
However, once a device has a digital output, we are in a different 
environment because the digital output allows a perfect copy to be 
made.… We are not happy if there’s a digital output without any 
restriction, because once the content is out, it’s available to be recopied 
without any restrictions by anyone…. 
 
Many people would agree that there are many situations in which 
making one copy for personal use is reasonable, especially in situations 
where you have paid for the original content. The question is where you 
draw the line on additional copies or sharing of copies with other people, 
and here it’s much harder to come up with a consensus.133 
Records, Inc. et al. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d. 1004 (9th Cir., 2001), MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
125 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 (U.S., 2005).
133 Interview with two executives from a major media company and motion picture studio, in Burbank, 
Cal. (Oct. 6, 2003) 
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In Japan, things are no different. Izumi Fukuda, General Manager of the Business 
Planning Department of Tresola Corporation that was established for distributing TV 
program online,134 and employed at TV Asahi, one of Japan’s major TV stations, says 
that it was because of the content owners’ fears that they employed the DRM system in 
a very strict manner in their test webcasts in late 2002 and early 2004. 
The right-holders believe that if something appears on the Net, it will be 
ripped. That is why we provided them with rock-solid security … in 
order to gain their trust.... There are some companies in the Net business 
who don't want to implement security because of its high cost. However, 
since things have become digital, the DRM aspect has become 
important, and it is a major premise that this is being implemented 
properly.135 
4.3.3.2 Is DRM-based Security the First Priority for Content Owners? 
If content owners fear digital output, the natural consequence is to limit any digital 
copying or digital transfer from the devices. It was not surprising, therefore, that, 
especially in its infancy, the implementers of DRM technologies tried to avoid 
flexibility such as allowing copying or transferring content. 
In order to express their concerns toward digital copies, content owners repeatedly 
 
134 Tresola is a company funded by three major TV stations in order to exploit business opportunities in 
the Internet market. It conducted two series of tests for distributing TV program over broadband in 
2002-3. After the tests, they announced that they would postpone the launch of the service, without any 
clear schedule for the future. For details about Tresola, see, infra Section 6.2.2. 
135 Interview with Izumi Fukuda, General Manager, Tresola Corporation, in Tokyo, Japan (Feb. 6, 
2005). 
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say, in the course of development of new devices, new business models, or new 
technological standards, that security is their priority. As an executive from a major 
media company and motion picture studio maintains: 
One area where protection technologies haven’t been effective yet is in 
the DVD space. The industry deployed security technologies when they 
first set the standards, but some measures have been less than ideally 
effective. But now DVD manufacturers don’t have a lot of motivation to 
go back and fix that, because the margins on DVD players have become 
so low (now the price is $39.99 at Best Buy). They may not want to 
spend an extra ten cents per unit, figuratively, to make it more secure. 
And even if they are willing to spend the money, we still have the 
legacy problem of how to change the technology in a way that the next 
generation doesn’t disenfranchise the installed-based hardware of 
consumers. 
 
So, now we are in this inflection point where the most efficient place we 
can do something effective is in next-generation media. Because we 
have to deal with the same manufacturers about high definition DVD, 
we have to move the DRM piece to be near the top of the list and say, 
“if we want to have even higher quality movies on this new platform, 
we need to make DRM a very high priority,” although we don’t know 
fully how we are going to implement it yet. The system has to have 
effective ways of exercising usage rules.136 
In practice, however, it is sometimes difficult to implement DRM-based protection 
with complete security because of the business costs. As Izumi Fukuda at Tresola, 





In order to ease the anxieties of the right-holders, we put a lot of effort 
into our explanations to obtain their consent, and also put a large effort 
into DRM, because it was necessary to allay their anxieties by showing 
them protection.... If these had to be considered unavoidable as 
necessary expenses, and if [running the business] didn’t pay under such 
expenses, then it means we would have no market.137 
In reality, Tresola decided to postpone their business because they found that it would 
not be profitable enough, given the high expenses of distributing DRM players and 
providing customer support.138 
There is, however, an objection to security being the first priority when thinking of 
DRM implementation. According to Gabe Zichermann, Vice President of Strategy and 
Communications at Trymedia Systems, a game distribution company using 
peer-to-peer network139 disagrees that the issue of security is important when pursuing 
an online distribution business. 
There is a common misperception about DRM. DRM is not strictly 
about security. Making that mistake, and it will not work. The purpose 
of DRM is for the following three things, in this order. No 1: make it as 
easy as possible for consumers to buy the product in question. No 2: 
give consumers fair and reasonable use rights to the product that you are 
selling them. No 3: protect it. And this is the common error: that you 
 
137 Interview with Izumi Fukuda, General Manager, Tresola Corporation, in Tokyo, Japan (Feb. 6, 
2005). 
138 Although it is not officially declared, Tresola has suspended their activities after their last test 
webcast using set top box in July 2004. See, Tresola press release page, 
http://www.tresola.com/fl/press/index.html, (last visited April 25, 2006). 
139 At least until 2005, Trymedia Systems used peer-to-peer network for their game distribution. See,
Press Release: World Media Signs Agreement with Trymedia Systems To Add Video Games to Legal 
P2P Peer Impact, http://www.trymedia.com/corporate/press/20050707.shtml (last visited April 28, 
2006). 
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reverse the order of these things in most DRM architectures. And what 
you do is you make the consumers angry, and what they do is they make 
you and the press angry….140 
Trymedia acknowledges, after a survey on their customers’ behaviors on copying game 
software, that there are customers who copy their products and exchange them with 
friends.141 Still, Zichermann thinks that lightweight and user-friendly DRM is better 
for their overall business, as explained in the next Section. 
4.3.3.3 Content Owners’ Duty and Incentive to Maximize Profit 
Of course, it is the content owners’ duty to their shareholders to maximize profit. 
To be able to do this, right-holders often claim that they have to manage every use of 
the content to make sure they get a proper monetary return from such uses. As Jeffery 
Lawrence at Intel puts it: 
 
140 Gabe Zichermann, Address at the Digital Hollywood Spring 2004 (Mar. 31, 2004). 
141 Press Release: Stats on consumer copying and sharing habits for PC games revealed, 
http://www.trymedia.com/corporate/press/20040324b.shtml (last visited April 28, 2006). 
The result of the survey is the following. 
15% of consumers admit to copying retail games in the past 6 months. 
66% asserted their right to make backup copies of games. 
64% said that illegal copying hurt game developers. 
Each admitted copier buys an average of 7 games per year and makes 17 copies. 
35 copies are made per 100 units sold on average. 
The top three reasons why people make copies: 
#1 Personal backup 
#2 To share with friends 
#3 To use them on multiple computers (such as desktop and laptop) 
The top reasons consumers share games are: 
#1 To play multiplayer games with their friends 
#2 Their friends asked them to 
#3 They thought their friends would like the game 
Consumers felt that their friends were honest people and that sharing could result in their friend buying 
his own copy about 50% of the time. 
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One true point is that, if they could, the content providers would try to 
extract as much value as they could from the consumers. So we have to 
make sure that the market works, and that they are always under some 
pressure to consider consumer preferences.142 
Also, Bob Ohlweiler describes the reactions of recording companies when they 
struggled to start their online music store. Negotiations with recording companies were 
difficult even after the success of the iTunes Music Store. 
Record labels originally did not want the other services to take the 
Apple model. They felt that Apple model was too liberal, and for one 
dollar the consumers should not be allowed to make copies for the 
entire life…. I spent my entire summer in New York to negotiate with 
the music labels. We ended up with pretty liberal rules.143 
However, there are some disagreements as to how much control is “better to 
maximize their profits.” Gabe Zichermann says: 
I think the recording industry and the motion picture industry need to 
step back and say, do I want to antagonize my customers, or do I want 
to sell products to my customers. Answer that first question. So, start by 
saying I want to sell products to my customers. 
 
Two, say “do I believe that my customers have the right to use content 
in certain ways?” which is another important area.144 
Then Zichermann describes responses of right-holders at a game developers’ 
conference. 
[E]very single one that you talked to [at the game conference], and you 
say, “you know, consumers should be able to make back-up copies of 
 
142 Interview with Jeffery Lawrence, Attorney, Intel, in Hillsboro, OR. (Aug. 14, 2003). 
143 Telephone Interview with Bob Ohlweiler, Senior Vice President, Musicmatch (Nov. 19, 2003). 
144 Gabe Zichermann, Address at the Digital Hollywood Spring 2004 (Mar. 31, 2004). 
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the games, right?” and they go “Absolutely.” “Consumers should be 
able to share copies with their friends and that results in revenues to you, 
right?” “Absolutely.”145 
As a proof, Zichermann explains that his game distribution business uses P2P 
technologies and has many customers who make some copies but is still making a 
profit. 
So last week,146 we announced the first coherent unified solution of 
digital rights on games and software that allows game and software 
publishers to protect the content with the same technique on discs and 
downloads. Consumers may now back up their game and software 
content that they buy on CD media, they may make copies, copies that 
are made on trial mode and may be passed along, with full track 
ability.… The reaction was phenomenal. Everybody in the game 
business gets it….147 
Therefore, according to Zichermann, the obligation to shareholders to run the business 
profitably does not necessarily mean having DRM technologies implemented in a very 
strict manner. 
In sum, the flexibility of usage rules in the course of DRM implementation seems 
to depend upon, at least to some extent, the right-holders’ recognition of what the 
“profitable” business models are, of consumer acceptance and satisfaction, or 
acknowledgements of users’ freedom or “rights” in using their works. 
 
145 Id.
146 Week of March 22, 2004. 
147 Gabe Zichermann, Address at the Digital Hollywood Spring 2004 (Mar. 31, 2004) 
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4.3.3.4 Licenses Are Difficult to Revise 
The preference for strict DRM implementation by right-holders appears not only 
when one tries to start a new business model. It also impacts when service providers 
try to change business models in favor of users. For example, this kind of struggle can 
be found in the case of i-mode mobile content distribution business by NTT Docomo. 
Nobuyuki Watanabe, a technology expert at NTT Docomo responsible for deciding 
the technological specifications of mobile handsets for the i-mode business, says that 
negotiations with content owners was relatively easy when they first started the i-mode 
business. 
In the i-mode service, [every content] is from ¥100 to ¥300 per month. 
With mobile handsets, a system has been launched so that downloaded 
content as a general rule cannot be sent out. [Such a system] made it 
possible to negotiate [to have content licensed] at extremely low 
royalties.148 
Watanabe then explains that this rule of “no copy allowed” restricts the technology 
design of the newer handsets.  
With camera phones, … since the copyright for photographs taken by 
the user basically belongs to the user himself, an external memory is 
provided. However, the form is such that downloaded content 
(including content forwarded from friends) cannot be stored into the 
external memory. Only photographs taken by the user himself can be 
stored in it. Also with the infrared communications of 504, the system is 
 
148 Interview with Nobuyuki Watanabe, NTT Docomo, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 11, 2002). 
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designed so that all content downloaded from the Net can’t be stored [in 
the external memory]….The basic elements of these standards are from 
the i-mode Business Division, and were determined so as to satisfy the 
needs of protecting content providers.149 
After describing the current system, Watanabe expresses the difficulty of revising their 
license terms with content owners, once agreements are made. This is not unique to 
copyright licenses. However, this difficulty is becoming a large concern for NTT 
Docomo, as the size of downloadable content becomes larger. Watanabe elaborates: 
Currently, when switching to a new mobile handset for reasons such as 
breakage or a model change, telephone listings can be transferred, but 
Java game applications or other copyrighted content cannot be 
transferred [to the new handset]. The basic position is to have the buyer 
repurchase [the content]. However, there has been a desire to be able to 
move [the content], since the content [size] is large, and the call charges 
[for downloading] would be by no means negligible. In particular, there 
has been a strong request from service departments which handle 
customer needs.150 
However, the request has not been accepted because of the reluctance to change the 
terms of content licenses. 
The i-mode Business Division is somewhat backward looking, because 
they believe that the basis of the business is for the content provider to 
have peace of mind.… The difficult thing is that allowing content to be 
transferred has no merit as far as content providers are concerned. They 
can see the risk aspect and therefore can't give their consent. From the 
technical aspect, it may be possible to transfer [content] to an external 





decryption keys, but the content providers have not given their OK.151 
Without a legal requirement or some other incentive to convince content owners to 
think otherwise, it may be difficult to persuade them to alter their favorable license 
terms in order to accommodate the user freedoms recognized in copyright law. 
4.3.3.5 Desire, Need, or Right to Protect the “Brand” of Works 
Another aspect of right-holders’ reluctance to employ “freedom-friendly” DRM 
implementation is their desire to protect the “brand image” or their copyrighted works, 
especially when they are well-known or established. In answer to the question of why 
they are not willing to let users modify their works as a part of fair use, an executive 
from a major media company and motion picture studio explained: 
[T]he most fundamental problem of consumer editing is that, they may 
republish and sell our content or offer it in damaging ways. We actually 
license the products to consumers from which they can copy and print 
our characters on invitation cards. But it would be very damaging for us 
if somebody creates a version containing pornography. I don’t think the 
law requires that people should be allowed to do such things.152 
This question of maintaining the “brand image” of copyrighted works becomes 
crucial, especially with regard to cartoon characters or other copyrighted works that 
can also serve as trademarks. For example, Disney has registered Mickey Mouse and 
 
151 Id.
152 Interview with two executives from a major media company and motion picture studio, in Burbank, 
Cal. (Oct. 6, 2003) 
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other cartoon characters as trademarks, both in the U.S. and Japan.153 Although the 
question of protection in the intertwining area of copyright and trademark (or unfair 
competition) is beyond the scope of this research, it is worthwhile mentioning, as a 
reality of the market, that right-holders’ desire or need to protect copyrighted works 
under trademark law (especially after the copyright has expired) is another large factor 
preventing flexible DRM implementation. 
This issue becomes more problematic in Japan, as the desire to keep the “brand 
image” of their works is legally protected as one of the moral rights.154 In Japan, 
copyright holders and performers have a “right to maintain the integrity of the 
work.”155 A great deal of attention has recently been called to this problem in Japan, 
and the government has started a working group to study a possible reduction in the 
 
153 See, e.g., U.S. Federal Trademark registration No. 75-311898 (Figure 1), JP Trademark registration 
No. 226416 (Figure 2), and JP Trademark registration No. 982917 (Figure 3). 
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 
154 In addition, moral rights complicate the problem of the anticommons, as moral rights are not 
assignable in Japan, thus increasing the number of right-holders when copyrights are assigned. 
155 Article 20 for copyright owners, and Article 90 ter for performers. 
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scope of moral rights.156 
4.3.4 The Problem of the Anticommons that Right Holders Face 
One of the reasons DRM technologies tend to have restricted usage rules that 
override the freedom within the copyright regime surely has to be the mindset of 
right-holders. And one of the ironies here is that, in some cases, right-holders 
themselves suffer from the tragedy of the anticommons, or the underuse of copyrighted 
information because of the multiple right-holders in a piece of content157 regarding the 
copyrighted works that they have rights to. 
Music and motion pictures in particular have many right-holders involved in one 
piece of content. Works of music have right-holders to melodies, lyrics, performance, 
and sound recordings. Motion picture right-holders include the authors of the original 
story and screenplay, directors, performers, other art designers, the people involved in 
the music included in the film. Therefore, right-holders such as record labels and 
 
156 In January 2005, the Copyright Council pointed out the necessity of theoretical and systematic 
research regarding the moral rights of authors, which should be entrusted to an external group consisting 
of specialists on the issue. See, ????????????????????????????
[Copyright Council, Current Issues Regarding Copyright Law]
at footnote 1, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/bunka/toushin/05012501/002.htm, (last visited 
April 25, 2006). 
157 The ideas of “anticommons property” and the “tragedy of the anticommons” are defined by Michael 
A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. 
L. Rev. 621 (1998). For application of anticommons theory to cyberspace, see, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyber 
space as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 439 (2003). See, also,
James Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & Econ.  
1 (2000). 
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motion picture studios often are unable to offer flexible licensing terms because they 
do not hold all the rights. 
For example, an executive from a major media company and motion picture studio 
says: 
There are other rights holders in our movies, and we don’t have a right 
to say that consumers can take out music that we have been licensed 
from someone else … and include them in other works, for example.158 
4.3.5 Voice and Power of Users of Copyrighted Works 
In order for the market to solve the problem of DRM implementation too often 
favoring right-holders, the users of copyrighted works have to have some voice and 
power in the market to reflect their needs. This section analyzes what mechanisms 
exist for users to reflect their voice, and how powerful their voice can be. 
4.3.5.1 Users Can Speak Through Money, but Not Efficiently 
Of course, the simplest answer is that users can express themselves as consumers 
in the market. Intel’s Jeffery Lawrence explains: 
At the end of the day, the market decides (the right balance between 
copyright holders and users)…. People won’t buy stuff they don’t 
like….159 
Bruce Polichar agrees that users speak for themselves. 
 
158 Interview with two executives from a major media company and motion picture studio, in Burbank, 
Cal. (Oct. 6, 2003) 
159 Interview with Jeffery Lawrence, Attorney, Intel, in Hillsboro, OR. (Aug. 14, 2003). 
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The customer speaks with only one voice: MONEY! When the 
customer sees something it likes, it says so by spending money to get it. 
That is the only message the CE or PC or new services industries can 
rely on. Very few people will guess correctly what the right offering is 
before they try it.... Customers don't ask anyone to look out for them. 
They just ask to be entertained. Whoever entertains them gets their 
money.160 
It is true that ultimately users speak as consumers in the market. For example, this 
has been somewhat true in the world of digital music distribution. The development of 
more flexible usage terms were pushed by consumer rejection of earlier and stricter 
usage rules, as well as by their clear preference for the flexibility manifested in P2P 
file-sharing networks. 
Jeffery Lawrence points out: 
In the case of music, content providers realize that you have to give a lot 
of flexibility to make them reach out for their content. People will steal 
it if you cannot make copies. They are learning in a hard way. The 
negotiations with the music companies have been very hard for us, 
because they want to hold back and have complete restraint. The truth is, 
it is not acceptable in the market place. And if you are a device 
manufacturer, you don’t want to invest a lot of money on technologies 
that you know consumers would reject. And so we have to negotiate 
with the content community to find a middle ground.161 
Kevin Saul, Director of Trademark, Copyright, & Corporation Marketing at the 
Legal Department of Apple Computer, Inc., pictures the episode of developing the 
 
160 E-mail from Bruce Polichar, Former Vice President, IBM, to the author (Nov. 11, 2003, 21:17:41 
PST)(on file with author). 
161 Interview with Jeffery Lawrence, Attorney, Intel, in Hillsboro, OR. (Aug. 14, 2003). 
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iTunes Music Store as follows: 
There was not a true popular music store before us. Some of the 
services were very restrictive. In practice, music companies are losing 
single sales and also CD sales year over year, and all of what I call 
“futile” attempts by the music business to protect their CDs are 
essentially competing with free. We wanted to provide a legitimate 
alternative. Apple is known for its user friendliness…. We spent a lot of 
time thinking about how we can navigate the center.... 
 
So we went into negotiations with major labels. We have to keep honest 
people honest. There are so many hackers out there, and our thought 
was that if we took the position of trying to absolutely prevent hacking 
of any usage rules or DRM, it would significantly impact the customers’ 
acceptance of the music store, and they would flock to the free 
services.162 
The result of Apple’s “experiment” was a great hit. It could be argued that such 
“success” was partly led by market mechanisms, especially by users sending signals 
that they did not like the old services with strict rules and that they preferred much 
more flexible usage terms. 
Chris Parkerson, DRM Evangelist at RSA Security, which provides DRM 
technologies to game consoles as part of their business, also recognizes the point: 
Ultimately, no one is going to sell anything if there are not providing 
services that consumers want, and they aren’t [now]…. There is always 
going to be a need, of course, for Hollywood and whomever to make 
sure that they are going to get paid and they are going to get their 
revenues, but nothing is ever going to be restrictive to the point that it 
 
162 Interview with Kevin Saul, Director, Apple Computer Inc., in Cupertino, Cal. (Nov. 20, 2003). 
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starts interfering with what consumers want, because what we will end 
up having is that consumers just won’t buy it. 
 
So, the weight is always going to hold with the consumers. I think we 
are still in very early stages; we’re really just trying to figure out exactly 
what it looks like.163 
However, the voice of consumers through money is not perfect, either. Although 
the purchasing practices of users in the market surely affect the direction of DRM 
developments, it sometimes takes a long time, a great deal of investments, and, in 
some cases, even illegal damage to both parties before the market reaches a better 
balance. This is because, in the market, users only have a choice “to buy or not to 
buy.” Money of users is not sufficient because it does not tell the content owners, 
service providers, or device makers what else users want or how they want the devices 
and services to be changed. 
4.3.5.2 Users Speak Through Technology Companies 
Therefore, to avoid unnecessary cost and pain, it would be better for both the users 
and suppliers of the market to have some mechanisms to represent the concrete needs 
of users in the course of DRM development and implementation. 
Michael Miron, CEO of ContentGuard, maintains that it would be “nice, and 
 
163 Interview with Chris Parkerson, DRM Evangelist, RSA Security, in L.A., Cal. (Mar. 31, 2005). 
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maybe even desirable,”164 to have consumers represented in the venues of DRM 
development and implementation, although not necessary because “[t]hey vote with 
their wallets and with their feet.”165 
It is easy to imagine that such a reflection of users’ voices is more difficult than 
suppliers’ voices because of the transaction cost. It is usually costly, and thus more 
difficult, to summarize the voices of users as a class in the market, which is already 
known in many fields such as product liability cases or environmental pollution or 
other nuisance cases, just to mention a few. In these cases, one approach to solving the 
problem is to use an agent. It is helpful to have an agent that understands the desire of 
the class properly and acts accordingly. 
In the history of copyright regulation, it is often believed or hoped that the 
technology industries, such as the PC industry, the CE industry, and the technology 
providers, act as one of the agents of the users.166 Is this mechanism still valid under 
the issue of DRM implementation? 
Technology industries have a strong incentive to know users’ preferences through 
 
164 Michael Miron, Opening Keynote Speech at Digital Rights Management Strategies 2004 conference 
(April 13, 2004). 
165 Id.
166 In the U.S., libraries have been another “agent” that has spoken for copyright users. However, 
because this chapter deals with the DRM implementation process, and because librarians are often not 
heavily involved in technology discussions, this research does not explore the role of librarians. 
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their response to products in the market. Some key players in the technology industry 
describe their attempts to reflect the preferences of users in the market. Jeffery 
Lawrence at Intel describes users’ needs and desires: 
People always want to make recordings. And from our perspective, 
content protection and DRM is not about limiting copying. In fact, the 
DRM should be all about enabling copying and enabling consumer use. 
The truth is: the thing that makes people buy products or consume 
contents is the ability to do things with the contents. They like to make 
copies. That is what they want. So what DRM should do is to create a 
protected environment [to do so]. You cannot put it onto the Internet to 
give it away to the world, but you can do things you want in your own 
personal environment. From our perspective, if I make a hundred 
million copies but all protected so that other people cannot use them, 
who would care? Why do content providers have to care about the fact 
that I move the contents to this device and that device as long as it is not 
put onto the Internet to be given away? In fact, they should like that, 
because that would make people buy more content…. 
 
In your home environment, [people expect that] you have substantial 
flexibility. Unless that actually happens, and consumers can do what 
they want to do, no DRM in the world would ever be effective, because 
consumers would reject it. If the consumers reject it, they will opt out 
for the illegitimate alternatives.167 
Bob Ohlweiler at Musicmatch describes the preferences of music listeners as follows: 
We know a lot about our consumers. Generally what they want is a 
library on multiple PCs, and many CDs without worrying about dipping 
into some quota for burning. And music labels want some limits on that. 
So Apple came up with this idea of “playlist.” 
 
167 Interview with Jeffery Lawrence, Attorney, Intel, in Hillsboro, OR. (Aug. 14, 2003). 
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[We understand their preferences] through focus groups, customer 
services, and speaking with customers, and talking with people inside 
the companies who are also the consumers of our product.168 
Given their understanding of customer preferences, technology companies and 
service providers convey the preferences to some extent in negotiations with content 
owners. Yoshisuke Kuroda at Sony explains: 
Speaking of management of content by DRM, there are some points 
without which you will not have a marketable product. For such points, 
we propose them to the content side. We communicate with them, 
telling them that, if that doesn't happen, ultimately, DRM itself will not 
work and products won't sell. When the rules of DRM are specifically 
determined, the device manufacturers will basically state their opinions 
from the users’ side. Then, finally, decisions will be made based on 
negotiations with the content holders.169 
Of course, this is not an easy process, especially in the DRM implementation. Kuroda 
describes the difficulties he faces: 
The position from the content side desiring to protect security is 
completely at odds with usability. We are stuck between the two sides 
and must make the adjustments. That is the hardest part.170 
Jeffery Lawrence admits that the influence of the copyright owners is growing in 
the area of DRM and that device manufacturers have more bargaining power than 
service providers do when negotiating with copyright holders. 
[H]ere is the dynamic of [how we keep the balance in DRM systems]. 
We need content and to make it friendly for our customers. Content 
 
168 Telephone Interview with Bob Ohlweiler, Senior Vice President, Musicmatch (Nov. 19, 2003). 
169 Interview with Yoshisuke Kuroda, General Manager, Sony, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 17, 2002). 
170 Id.
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owners need content protection. Nobody wants to pay for content 
protection, but we need that to support a legitimate business model. And 
none of us want the government to come in and arbitrate what the rules 
should be.… 
 
DRM solution companies and other Internet content service providers 
have to get content straight from the content providers. They don’t have 
leverage over content providers at all. They have to do whatever content 
providers want. In fact, that is the great beauty of DRM, because that 
would give content providers great flexibility, whether to offer to see it 
once, twice, or for a day. The only problem is, the DRM cannot reach 
everywhere in the home. DRM is only one piece of the technology. It 
has to have clients anywhere, otherwise it cannot go there. 
 
Then there is other group of people who build devices. And device 
manufacturers have some leverage over content providers, because they 
have a variety of ways to get content. They can get content from TV, 
packages, the Internet; they can even have illegal [and unprotected] 
content. So, they are less dependent. And content providers need 
devices to see the content, and they need protection there. So, there is a 
room for content providers [to make compromises].171 
However, Lawrence also makes clear that there are limits in what they can get from 
negotiations with content owners. 
We are trying to make sure we are engaged in the discussion, and the 
only leverage you have is to bring your technologies and find solutions 
to their problem that are reasonable. It’s a negotiation to get the 
minimum [of freedom]. 
 
That’s how we set the floor, i.e., set the minimum standards. That is the 
best we can do. We don’t have more leverage with the content providers. 
And we see what they offer. We cannot make them offer different 
 
171 Interview with Jeffery Lawrence, Attorney, Intel, in Hillsboro, OR. (Aug. 14, 2003). 
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products….172 
Lawrence also makes clear that the fair use doctrine or other statutory exemptions are 
not necessarily the guiding principle of negotiations when they try to get flexibility in 
DRM implementation. 
Fair use is great, but it is really a narrow exception. In practice, as a 
product maker, I am not interested in fair use. I want more than fair use. 
I don’t think people would buy a DVD to snip a small piece of the DVD 
and write a book report. That is not why people buy devices. I want 
more. That is where the technology community will get together and 
negotiate with the content community to have a deal. That should be 
done through business deals. The content community is coming to 
understand that they have to meet consumer expectations.173 
Lawrence says that in areas with established customs, it is easier to negotiate. 
The only place we have public policy is the area that people are used to 
already. Cable TV and packaged media, these have been out there for 
some time now, and people have expectations of devices and media, [so 
DRM should meet these expectations].174 
Lawrence uses an example of usage rules in Digital Transmission Content Protection 
(DTCP), which is a cryptographic protocol to protect audio/video content while 
allowing the content to travel over the Internet.175 
In terms of DTCP, the primary use is to help you distribute TV and 
cable content. But the condition there is that, if the content is free cable 





175 See, for details, DTCP Homepage, http://www.dtcp.com (last visited April 25, 2006). The White 
Paper was issued on July 14, 1998, by a group of companies called 5C (Hitachi, Intel, Matsushita, Sony, 
and Toshiba). See, http://www.dtcp.com/data/wp_spec.pdf (last visited April 27, 2006). 
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cable, like HBO, people can still make copies, maybe not millions of 
them, but still can in archive as well. The only area that you cannot copy 
is the PPV. This was the deal made with content communities. Content 
providers gave up these rights to have protection technologies for 
them.176 
However, such a “policy call” does not exist where people try to establish a new 
business model. Lawrence maintains, 
But there are many new areas, and that’s where the all real business is 
going to be. Who decides the rules there? I don’t think that’s the role of 
the government. It is basically the role of content providers. But we can 
negotiate with them because they need us.177 
For such new areas of business, there is no other means but to negotiate using 
repeated trial and error in order to reach a comfortable solution. This process needs 
much more effort than is usually claimed in order to get a well-balanced DRM 
implementation. It is not an easy process, as every industry has its own goals and 
interests. As Bruce Polichar states, 
In some ways it is unavoidable that each industry pursues its own 
business. There is more dialog between these industries than there used 
to be. But it will never be a real partnership where they all collaborate to 
build new markets. Each part of the triangle still wants to maximize its 
own position.178 
However, people always learn lessons, and things are still getting better. As Chris 
Parkerson states, 
 
176 Interview with Jeffery Lawrence, Attorney, Intel, in Hillsboro, OR. (Aug. 14, 2003). 
177 Id.
178 E-mail from Bruce Polichar, Former Vice President, IBM, to the author (Nov. 10, 2003, 09:34:26 
PST)(on file with author). 
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It is getting better.… I think [the success of iTunes] was really what has 
got a change, and the content owners are starting to get a little bit more 
engaged.… [but] the fact that they have been taking a more active role 
… in defining “what do you need to facilitate your business” has been 
rather a set back. I think it’s because there’s still an animosity on the 
content owners’ side toward new technologies, toward technology 
companies. I think they are getting better. [However,] I think we would 
be in a slightly different world right now, if content owners had been a 
lot more active in defining the rules of these digital contents.179 
In sum, in order to reflect users’ voices in the early stages of service and device 
design, technology companies make some efforts in negotiations with content holders. 
However, both the understanding and power of technology companies are sometimes 
rather limited to reflect the sincere voices of the users in the course of DRM 
implementation. Therefore, in new services or business models where customs are not 
yet established, technology companies can gain only the “minimum” freedom when 
copyright owners are unwilling to give it, given the difference in legal standings. Many 
efforts are made in the market, but it is still a very slow move. Also, it is questionable 
whether DRM implementation completely reflects the freedom implemented in the 
traditional copyright regime, as players in the market do not fully respect the rules in 
the law as their guiding principles. 
4.4 Can the Market Really Solve the Problem of Override? 
 
179 Interview with Chris Parkerson, DRM Evangelist, RSA Security, in L.A. Cal. (Mar. 31, 2005). 
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Given the description of the players in the market above, it is now useful to ask this 
question: Can the market really solve the problem of strict DRM implementations 
overriding the freedom within the copyright regime? Or, more precisely, can the 
market bring DRM implementations that fully respect the freedom within the 
copyright regime? 
As described above, some of the freedom is actually implemented given the 
pressure of the market. Online music stores now respect freedom or “users’ rights,” 
such as the freedom to make backup copies or freedom to give the content to a limited 
number of friends. It took several years and significant suffering in the music industry 
before they reached the current business model.180 Still, many people attribute this 
“success” to the market. 
However, not every problem can be solved in this way, especially for issues which 
a limited number of people are involved in. For example, making backup copies is 
important, but it is still only one form of fair use or statutory exemption. There are 
many other exemptions to be taken care of. Even the iTunes Music Store does not 
allow exempted uses which include modification of works such as quotations. This 
may be because (1) the need to make quotations or re-mixing is much smaller or far 
 
180 This is partly because of the transaction cost and the agency problem in the market. 
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less recognized by the market than the need to make backup copies; (2) some content 
owners have negative feelings toward modification, and in Japan, there is a moral right 
to maintain the integrity of works; (3) it is technologically much more challenging to 
protect the content while allowing modification compared to allowing simple copying; 
and (4) the value of such utilization of copyrighted works is a positive externality and 
thus will not be fully considered by the market.181 Given these factors, it can be said 
that it is much more difficult for the market to make DRM implementation include 
exemptions with modifications. 
Another difficulty in solving the problem through the market is caused by the 
highly technological aspect of DRM technologies. Content owners, who have the final 
word in deciding the use of content (which in many cases determines the design of 
services and devices), are still slow in fully understanding the technologies. Therefore, 
they may not completely understand the limitations of DRM technologies, or may not 
understand the best use of them. The highly technological aspect also makes it difficult 
for end-users of content to feed back their voices into the market, as they may not fully 
understand what technologies are doing in their devices, and they may not be able to 
 
181 See, Wendy Gordon, The ‘Market Failure’ and Intellectual Property: A Response To Professor 
Lunney, 82 B.U.L. Rev. 1031, 1033, Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,
83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1046-50, 1058-65 (2005). 
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provide sufficient proposals to solve the problems they encounter. 
In addition, as has been repeatedly pointed out, differences in legal standings 
between right-holders and content users182 creates a difference of bargaining power in 
the negotiations, and makes the content rules heavily dependent on right-holders. 
Under such circumstances, it is very hard to implement fair use and other copyright 
exemptions. 
Therefore, it seems that some part of the override problem may not be able to be 
solved through the market, at least in the short run. In some areas, the market process 
is in a vicious circle: DRM implementation is very strict; which causes less consumer 
acceptance in the market and more illegal conduct by consumers; which creates the 
fear and defensive attitude of content holders; which may lead to a stronger desire for 
stricter usage rules of content. In order to improve the situation, Section 5 below 
explores some choices of what law can do to keep a better balance of interest between 
copyright owners and users in DRM implementations. 
5. The Problem of Overriding Freedom (2): What Law Can Do to Help Keep a 
Better Balance 
As explained above, this section explores some legal options to help keep a better 
 
182 See, supra Section 4.2. 
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balance of interests between right-holders and content users within the field of DRM 
technologies.183 
The following first explores the possibility of repealing the current 
anti-circumvention regulations under certain conditions (5.1). It then explores some 
legislative options under the basic frame of anti-circumvention regulations to help 
reserving freedoms within the copyright regime (5.2). There are also brief discussions 
about the possibility of “freedom enabled by DRM technologies.” 
5.1 Choice (1): Repeal Legal Protection for DRM Technologies when Creating 
Problems 
If some of the DRM implementation diminishes the freedom within the copyright 
regime, and if anti-circumvention regulations fix the problem by blindly protecting 
these problematic DRM technologies in the market, one legislative option to help 
reduce such problems is to repeal the legislation when fixing the problem.  
One idea would be to legally protect DRM implementations only when they are 
 
183 Although law can impact the market by in both legislative phase and enforcement phases, the 
following focuses on the legislative side of the argument. Legislative choices (as well as case law s in 
the U.S.) primarily set the line between legal and illegal actions. However, in reality, as often pointed 
out, enforcement policy has a large impact on the actual policy of how free copyright usage is. In fact, 
one of the problems of DRM technologies is their capacity to enforce the rules privately and thoroughly, 
which has never been the case in the analog world. See, Lessig, supra note 94 at 127-30 (Minneapolis: 
Sagebrush Education Resources 1999) See, also, infra note 212 about self-help. However, it will require 
substantial research to discuss how thorough the enforcement should be and related topics (e.g., privacy 
issues) and is outside of the scope of this article. 
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well-balanced with regard to the interests of rights holders and users.184 In other words, 
legislators can use anti-circumvention regulations as a tool to create incentives for 
better-balanced DRM implementations.  
Under this scheme, the challenge arises in the problem of drawing a clear line 
between well-balanced DRM implementations worth protecting and unbalanced 
implementations not worth protecting. If the line is ambiguous, there will be confusion 
and chilling effects in the market, which may make regulations very costly in a 
different sense. However, this problem of how to define a “well-balanced DRM 
implementation” is not unique to this proposal. Rather, it is a common challenge when 
legislators try to keep anti-circumvention regulations while also trying to minimize 
their negative effects. 
For example, with regard to the freedom of copyright use based on exceptions, the 
problem of defining “well-balanced DRM implementations” has many similarities to 
the problem of creating proper and clear carve-outs within anti-circumvention 
regulations, as discussed below.185 If the exceptions or carve-outs for the freedom of 
copyright can be defined clearly enough to avoid confusion in the course of DRM 
 
184 Suggested by Lawrence Lessig, in a meeting with the Author. 
185 For the problems and challenges of setting up a proper exceptions and carve-outs, See, infra Section 
5.2.2.2.2. 
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implementation, there would be no significant additional chilling effect of law that 
protects only DRM implementations that respect those exceptions and carve-outs. 
Still, this legislative choice requires careful study for proper exceptions on the 
impact on technological research and development, because even a well-balanced 
DRM implementation may need to be circumvented for legitimate research purposes.  
5.2 Choice (2): Try to Keep Balance Within the Anti-Circumvention 
Regulations 
If legislators decide to maintain the main framework of the anti-circumvention 
regulations as it is now, the next question is to consider any possible means to 
minimize the negative impact caused by the maintained anti-circumvention regulations. 
The major legal means is to establish proper statutes of exceptions and carve-outs to 
the anti-circumvention regulations. In addition, stating some of the copyright 
exceptions (such as fair use) as an affirmative right instead of a defense may help the 
interests of copyright users to be better represented in the market of DRM 
implementations. 
In the following, this article first explores the option of creating legal exemptions 
to give a right to hack when there is a legitimate need (5.2.1). Next, it gets into the 
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question of how to realize freedom without recognizing a right to hack, which means 
to respect the freedom within DRM schemes (5.2.2). As a premise to this discussion, 
this article first analyzes whether the freedom incorporated within the copyright 
regime can be embodied within DRM schemes (5.2.2.1). It suggests at the end that, 
barring a higher transaction cost for users, similar freedom could be materialized by 
combining systems based on computers and human institutions. Given such 
possibilities, this Section proceeds to describe three possible legal options to help 
realize balanced DRM systems (5.2.2.2).  
5.2.1 A Right to Hack: Legal Exemption to Anti-circumvention Regulations 
Although it sounds rather drastic, the idea of giving a right to hack is ready used in 
the current anti-circumvention regulations.186 Exemption statutes in both U.S. and 
Japanese anti-circumvention regulations allow people to hack DRM technologies or to 
provide circumvention devices under certain conditions. Therefore, giving a right to 
hack is an established way of minimizing the negative effect of anti-circumvention 
regulations. It is a means that can respond to the freedom to use copyrighted materials 
when allowed under traditional copyright regulations, as well as the freedom of 
research and development in the field of DRM technologies. In fact, the DMCA has 
 
186 See, Bechtold, supra note 3 at 371-74. 
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exceptions that respond to both of these problems, although narrowly tailored.187 
The important question in this approach is the scope and the manner of the 
exemptions. One of the major criticisms of the DMCA is its narrowness, and the 
ambiguities and complexities of its statutory exemptions. For example, there is no 
clear reason why encryption research and other fields of research related to DRM 
technologies could be reasonably discriminated against in Section 1201 (g).188 In 
Japan, there is no distinction in the exempted area of research. 189  An equally 
important issue is the manner of articulating exception rules, i.e., its clearness and 
simplicity. Complex and unclear manners of exceptions cause chilling effects and 
eliminate opportunities for legitimate content use and technological research and 
development. 190  As the U.S. reviews the proper scope of exemptions to 
anti-circumvention regulations every four years, there is an opportunity in the future to 
correct such narrowness, complexities and ambiguities if the government wishes. 
The good thing about the right-to-hack approach is the flexibility it provides the 
 
187 For example, exemption for reverse engineering, encryption research and security testing are for 
technological innovation, and exemptions for libraries, archives and educational institutions and 
government activities are for freedom on content use. See, 17 U.S.C. §1201 (d)(e)(f)(g)(j). 
188 See, e.g., Submission of Edward W. Felten on Copyright Office Rulemaking on Exemption to 
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/FeltenDMCA.pdf (last visited April 27, 2006). 
189 See, supra Section 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.2.1. 
190 See, supra Section 3.3.2. 
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beneficiaries. There is no restriction on how to circumvent the DRM technologies, as 
opposed to the freedom incorporated within DRM systems approach described 
below.191 The transaction costs for users to circumvent DRM systems, and for DRM 
providers to allow such circumvention, are both generally lower than to incorporate 
tools for freedom within DRM systems. Users do not need to go through the 
procedures to achieve freedom incorporated within DRM systems; they have only to 
look for circumvention tools when they think it is legitimate. On the DRM providers’ 
side, the costs are also lower, as they do not have to prepare a tool or procedure to 
allow user freedoms within their DRM systems. They just have to let users make their 
own decisions, and exercise their rights when they think it is proper. Therefore, this 
approach might be better than the system described below. 
Again, some cultural differences in how comfortable people feel asserting their 
exceptions and how right-holders feel about trusting the general public may have some 
impact on the policy decision in this aspect.192 In any event, it is desirable for 
legislators to make exemption statutes clear to avoid misjudgment. 
There are some downsides in giving a right to hack. Many right-holders are still 
 
191 See, infra Section 5.2.2. 
192 See, supra Section 3.1.1.2. 
97 
afraid of the risk of abuse by broadly authorizing the right to hack, and there should be 
considerable work to get over such fears. Also, for technologically non-savvy people, a 
right to hack is not very helpful without authorized circumvention tools. In order to 
solve this problem, the government could provide some exceptions in anti-device 
regulations to allow people an opportunity to use circumvention devices for legitimate 
purposes.  
5.2.2 Support Freedom Incorporated within DRM Systems 
Another legislative means is to legally support or encourage DRM 
implementations to be freedom-friendly without giving people an instant right to hack. 
In other words, under this approach, freedom would be enabled within the usage rules 
of DRM systems (coded freedom), or freedom would be granted after some procedures 
with an institution that authorizes circumvention (institutionalized freedom).193 Coded 
freedom and institutionalized freedom can be combined to enable a proper and 
cost-efficient design of freedom within a particular DRM system.194 
5.2.2.1 Freedom within DRM systems? 
 
193 For an insightful article proposing the possibility of a coded and an institutionalized approach, and 
its possible combination, see, Dan L. Burk and Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights 
Management Systems, 15 Harv. J. L. & Tech 41 (2001). The following description in this article is to 
elaborate the suggestion made by Burk & Cohen. See, also, Bechtold, supra note 3 at 374-79 about Key 
Escrow.
194 See, Burk & Cohen, Id. at 65-70. 
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First, it is necessary to examine the possibility of including within the DRM 
system some of the freedom defined in the copyright law. 
There are two possible ways to incorporate freedom into DRM systems: one is to 
program it into computer software (or, in some cases, hardware) (coded approach) and 
the other is via human intervention (institutionalized approach). The bottom line is that 
one can mimic some of the freedom set forth in the copyright law by combining a 
coded approach and an institutionalized approach.195  The following will briefly 
explain what coded and institutionalized approaches are, their differences, pros, and 
cons, and an example of how coded and institutionalized approaches can work 
together. 
Because freedom via DRM systems inherently includes monitoring and judgments 
regarding the use of copyrighted works, this type of freedom-delivery system creates 
primary concerns about privacy issues. Although privacy issues are outside the scope 
of this research, it is worth noting that the system design should be privacy-sensitive, 
and that such privacy concerns can be mitigated to a certain extent by the structure of 
privacy-related data management.196 
195 See, Id. 
196 Privacy concerns regarding the use of copyrighted works first arise when an entity starts to collect 
data about the subject and object of the use. However, such data collection may be necessary in order to 
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5.2.2.1.1 Coded Approach 
Here, a coded approach is referred to as any kind of automated systems generated 
by computers and which realize a part of or all the requirements for the free uses of 
copyrighted works recognized within copyright law.197 Such freedom includes: fair 
use or other copyright statutory exceptions, freedom to use materials in the public 
domain, and any part of the requirements for such freedom that can be coded into a 
computer or a DRM system. 
Michael Miron, the CEO of ContentGuard, Inc., thinks that some freedom can be 
situation-specifically coded: 
[Y]ou can use, for example, the MPEG well to create a license grant to 
mimic fair use for particular domains. And they will be specific to 
particular types of implementations. An example would be to give a 
grant for all students registered at an academic institution for a 
particular time period during a semester, and for professors or librarians 
to grant certain distribution… rights to any student registered for the 
academic year. So you can mimic certain uses for academic institutions. 
But this could be domain specific.... 
 
enable transactions regarding copyrighted work, especially over the Internet. Even in such cases, 
however, privacy concerns can be reduced by avoiding aggregating data beyond what is necessary. This 
is because privacy concerns increase by relating different kinds of data to each other, especially together 
with data that allows the identification of people. For example, credit card information, name or other 
personal identification, and how the copyrighted work is used can all be maintained separately in 
independent databases, and connected to each other only through an anonymous number and processed 
separately by different people or departments. Therefore, in this research, the following discussion is 
based on the assumption that privacy concerns can be reduced to a tolerable level by the system design. 
For a theory of a system with data confidentiality, see, Adi Shamir, How to Share a Secret, 22 
Communications of the ACM, 612 (1979). 




The same is true for first sale, where a rights expression involving 
lending, transfer, and delegation can be created. There is a notion of 
meta-rights, or rights about rights. I have a right to grant or I have a 
right to revoke, and so I could construct certain license grants that 
delegate the right to do all the things, like you mimic first sale. Again, 
domain specific, and you have to strike a deal with content players for 
particular distribution models.198 
However, you cannot code every kind of freedom as is stated in law. Generally, 
coded approach is more suitable to materialize requirements that are defined in a rather 
specific manner. For example, personal noncommercial recording of TV programs for 
time-shifting is recognized as one form of fair use in the U.S.199 Article 30 of the 
Copyright Law of Japan also states that private copying within the home environment 
is exempt from copyright infringement. Therefore, if you wish, DRM implementers 
can code into their DRM systems a tool to allow users to make a copy for the purpose 
of such time-shifting or private copying. Such usage rules may include usage beyond 
the freedom authorized by copyright law, and thus partly be based on licenses. 
However, it is clear at the same time that part of it is to materialize the freedom or 
exemption authorized by copyright law.200 
198 Michael Miron, Opening Keynote Speech at Digital Rights Management Strategies 2004 conference 
(April 13, 2004). 
199 See, Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-55. (1984). 
200 One difficult question in programming the coded freedoms is suggested here: it is sometimes very 
difficult to draw a clear line between free uses and uses that require licenses. Therefore, under current 
situation where law does not clearly give carve-out statutes, it is not surprising that a system designer 
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In order to program certain requirements for freedom within the DRM system, 
system designers first have to define in rather specific detail what kind of freedom they 
want to allow within the system. Whether it is based on freedom within the copyright 
regime or on the license given by right-holders, such freedom or flexibility should be 
broken down to specific sets of usage rules, such as: Who can make how many copies 
of what material under what kinds of circumstances and for how long? The major 
problem here is that the freedom within the copyright law is not written in a manner 
that can be directly coded into DRM systems. Current statutes are too ambiguous and 
not well-enough defined in most cases. The fair-use principle in U.S. copyright law is 
the best example facing this difficulty.201 There are a lot of categories of uses that are 
respected under the fair use doctrine, which can be different in each jurisdiction within 
the U.S., and which can be changed over time. It can even be hard for a human brain to 
categorize and specifically define every kind of fair use recognized under the law. It 
might be possible for computers to do so with a savvy artificial intelligence system; 
however, even if this were possible, it would be too expensive for mass-market 
consumer products to include such artificial intelligence in the short run. Therefore, it 
 
tries to get a license for everything to avoid possible infringement risks, which leads to less 
implementation of freedom because of its rights-clearance costs. 
201 See, Burk & Cohen, supra note 193 at 55-6. 
102 
is generally thought very difficult to codify a general principle of fair use.202 
It would be relatively easier to code rather specific exemptions with particular 
requirements and settings. In this sense, Japanese copyright statutory exemptions have 
an advantage over the U.S. fair use doctrine. However, even Japanese exemptions are 
not designed to be programmed into DRM systems, and thus leave many uncertainties 
or ambiguities to be cleared in order to be implemented into DRM systems. Still, such 
clarification would require less work compared with more general principles such as 
fair use. 
In addition, coded approach has its own limits. Building a computer system can be 
too costly, and computers are generally not good at identifying the purpose or context 
of use. Thus, it might be economically feasible to delegate some or all parts of the 
process to human intelligence, which this article refers to as the institutionalized 
approach below. 
5.2.2.1.2 The Institutionalized Approach 
The institutionalized approach is defined here as a system that uses human 
judgment (along with some technological assistance, if necessary) to realize freedom 
 
202 Id. See, also, Edward W. Felten, A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair Use, Communications of the 
ACM 46(4), 56, 61. (April 2003). 
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or part of its requirements. This approach to freedom is based on the idea that human 
judgment can supplement what is too difficult or costly for computers (i.e., the coded 
approach). A well-known example of this institutionalized freedom would be the key 
escrow approach that Burk and Cohen propose. They describe a system in which DRM 
providers would escrow decryption keys or circumvention devices in a trusted 
third-party organization so that people who want to make fair use can seek the DRM 
key online.203 
The institutionalized approach can also be more limited in scope than is suggested 
by Burk and Cohen. For example, it can be used to authenticate only one rather than 
all of the requirements. The Copyright Law of Japan, for example, allows school 
textbook publishers and educational-television program-producers to use published 
materials with a fair amount of compensation.204 An institution can handle the 
authentication process of the beneficiaries of these copyright exceptions (e.g., 
authorized school-textbook publishers) to hand out circumvention devices to enable 
their permitted use, but the institution need not necessarily check the actual uses of the 
copyrighted materials. The review of whether such uses are within the scope of 
 
203 See, Burk & Cohen, supra note 193 at 59-65. For a key escrow system, see, Id. at 63. 
204 Articles 34 and 35 of the Copyright Law of Japan. 
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statutory limitation can be delegated to the normal court procedure, for example. Or, in 
a different system design, the coded approach might be used to authenticate the 
beneficiary, and the institutionalized approach for the review of use. 
In the following section, this research will compare general differences between 
coded freedom and institutionalized freedom, and explore how these two can be 
combined to make copyright exceptions available under DRM and anti-circumvention 
regulations. 
5.2.2.1.3 Choosing between the Coded and Institutionalized Approaches—An 
Example 
When one combines both the coded approach and the institutionalized approach, 
many forms of copyright limitation can be materialized within the DRM system. 
Overall, it is true that more transaction costs would be placed on users compared to the 
analog world, as the de facto starting point is under the DRM control.205 Still, one can 
at least claim that it is better to have some system that opens up a legitimate way to 
secure freedom than none. Therefore, in the following, this article lists several issues to 
be considered when trying to design a system that enables freedom recognized in the 
 
205 See, Burk & Cohen, supra note 193 at 59-60. They point out that such high transaction cost would 




Choosing between the coded approach using computers and the institutionalized 
approach using human powers, or deciding how to combine these two, can be done by 
comparing the efficiencies and costs of each approach.206 
The first step in determining which approach to use is to break down the 
exemption rules into a set of relatively clear requirements. As previously stated, 
system designers would face great difficulties when they tried to break down the U.S. 
fair use principle into a set of clearer rules. More specific statutory exemptions, 
however, such as some of those in the Copyright Law of Japan, are relatively easier to 
analyze and program. 
For example, Article 33 of the Copyright Law of Japan allows school textbook 
publishers to quote published works “to the extent deemed necessary for the purpose 
of school education,” along with a reasonable compensation, the amount of which is 
fixed by the Commissioner of the Agency for Cultural Affairs (a governmental body in 
charge of copyright regulation). This Article can be broken down to four requirements: 
(i) the subject of the use should be publishers of textbooks authorized by the 
 
206 In addition to the factors described below, there is another question of privacy or anonymity of uses, 
especially when one thinks of the institutionalized approach. See, Burk & Cohen, Id. at 60-1. 
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Ministry of Education and Science; 
(ii) the object of the use should be works already made public; 
(iii) the purpose and manner should be deemed necessary for school education; 
and 
(iv) the quoting publishers should pay the amount of compensation designated 
by the Commissioner of the Agency of Cultural Affairs. 
The next step is to ask whether computers can process each of the requirements set 
forth in the above process. This is because, if a requirement is practically very difficult 
or too costly for computers to clear, there is no choice left for system designers but to 
leave the requirement to human institutions. 
To elaborate more, computers are generally good at processing a large amount of 
data, if such data can be properly prepared and the rules of processing are properly 
programmed. However, computers have some limits on their capacities: they are 
usually not good at processing the purposes of uses that people have in their minds, or 
usage contexts that require complex judgments. Of the four requirements set forth in 
Article 33, for example, the purpose and manner of the use in requirement (iii) would 
be very costly or nearly impossible for computers to decide. Therefore, a reasonable 
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choice is to leave this part of requirement to some human institution.  
On the other hand, other requirements under Article 33 can be processed by both 
computers and by human institutions. In such cases, the next question is which 
approach, coded or institutionalized, will cost less. There are two kinds of costs 
involved when the systems are designed: costs of regular processing and costs of 
irregular results. There are also two or three parties involved: system providers (and 
right-holders) and system users. The ideal choices should be the ones in which costs 
are affordable and preferably low for every party involved. However, in some cases, 
one choice would put more burden on one party while benefiting the other party more. 
In such a case, the choice is more of a policy question, which legislators have to 
decide. 
The regular costs for running each system may include costs such as the following: 
(a) Initial cost for building and installing the system. For example, authentication or 
validation of the qualified textbook publishers can be done by matching a user ID 
and the data of qualified publishers. The cost of handing out the user IDs and 
building the database of qualified publishers, and the cost of matching these two, 
should be calculated and compared between the computer-based process and the 
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human-based process. 
(b) Running cost of the system: for the coded approach, the maintenance and update 
fee, and for the institutionalized approach, the labor cost of running and updating 
the institution. 
(c) The cost related to system changes in the long run: flexibility of changes that could 
be made according to the possible change in rules in the future, or in order to make 
improvements in the system. For larger and more drastic changes, the computer 
system might cost more than in human institutions, which could respond by 
revising the working manuals and retraining the human resources. 
(d) The cost on the user’s side: ease and clarity of the user interface or its process, 
availability of the system, and consistency or accuracy of rule application and 
judgment. Generally, if programmed properly with accurate data, computers are 
good at giving consistent and accurate application with more availability. However, 
the ease of use greatly depends upon the user interfaces, which varies between the 
systems. Also, the access cost may depend upon the system design: if access to a 
coded system is made easily available over the Internet, for example, it may be 
lower than access costs to human institutions, which often has time restraints as 
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well as stricter capacity restraints. However, if the coded system is poorly designed, 
again, the system would end up having a human-based customer-support system. 
In such a case, it may be less expensive in the end for both the users and the system 
to provide only the institutionalized system. 
The next group of costs to be considered is the irregular cost, or risk, of running 
the system. For example, such costs may include issues such as: 
(a) Risk of making errors when building the system: This can also be viewed as the 
flip side of costs in breaking down the statutory requirements into a programmable 
form. Thus, there would be a role for legislators or the government, as described 
below, to clearly state the requirements in a more programmable way to avoid this 
risk and cost. 
(b) Risk of misapplying the system to each case: both humans and computers can be 
tricked by potential infringers; and the system can malfunction. In addition, human 
judgment is more vulnerable to bias than the binary judgments of computers.  
(c) Cost of correcting the abovementioned errors. 
Apart from how easily mistakes can be made, there is always a question of which 
party takes primary responsibility when talking about designing the type of system that 
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Burk and Cohen suggest.207 The players can be right-holders, users, or third parties. 
This question involves two issues. One is the problem of the potential bias of the 
system designer. This is more prominent in the institutionalized approach: however, 
the same problem exists for the coded approach. The other is the transaction costs of 
achieving exempted uses. 
For example, if users have the primary responsibility in designing or using the 
system for exempted uses, there is always a risk of users biasing the system in their 
favor, which may result in infringement and damage to right-holders. However, such 
risk involves a trade-off regarding transaction costs. The transaction costs of getting an 
exemption borne by users are, in many cases, much lower compared to other system 
designs for which the primary decision makers are other parties and thus may require 
additional steps by users to seek decisions from those responsible for it. The 
right-to-hack approach 208  taken by the DMCA and Japanese anti-circumvention 
regulations can be viewed as an extreme example of a design in which users exercise 
the power of primary judgment, because they both allow users to create and use 
circumvention devices based on their own judgment. 
 
207 See, Burk & Cohen, supra note 193 at 59. 
208 See, supra Section 5.4.2.1. 
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On the other hand, there can be a system design in which the primary responsibility 
for making decisions within the system (such as rule design and application) rests with 
right-holders. In this case, the risk of infringement would be low. Rather, there is a risk 
that right-holders will disrespect the exempted freedoms of users. For example, the EU 
Copyright Directive of 2001 takes this approach in several cases, especially with 
content distribution in on-demand download services along with a contract. As Article 
6 Section 4 Subsection 4 of the EU Copyright Directive makes clear, Member States 
cannot take any legislative means to secure copyright limitation when right-holders 
decide to take that particular business model.209 This means that the EU Copyright 
Directive leaves to right-holders the decision of whether they will provide a system 
that recognizes copyright limitations. 
The least biased design is to give primary responsibility to a neutral third party. It 
could be an existing institution such as the courts, or it could be new organizations 
with simpler procedures and lower costs.210 Thus, freedom might be better secured 
while lowering the risk of infringement. However, this could be the choice with higher 
 
209 See, Bechtold, supra note 3 at 378. See, also, Stefan Bechtold, Commentary on the European 
Directive 2001/29/EC, in CONCISE COMMENTARY ON EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW, (T. Dreier and P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz eds., Kluwer Law International, forthcoming end of 2005/2006). 
210 Such third-party organizations are suggested by several scholars. See, Burk & Cohen, supra note 
193 at 61-65, Bechtold, supra note 3 at 375. 
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transaction costs for both users and right-holders, because both must be involved in 
some process to deal with the parties making decisions. These costs can be lowered to 
a certain extent, and should be made as low as possible,211 but they would not be zero. 
Also, the problem of how to finance the institution would become a more urgent issue 
than whom to delegate the decision to, right-holders or users. 
Another issue to be considered in the course of system design is: when to make the 
screening and judgment of each requirement. Taking the example of the quotation 
again, there can be four phases to making judgments and screenings for each 
requirement. The first is before the decoding of applied DRM on the work to be 
quoted; the second is after the decoding and before the actual editing such as copying 
and pasting; the third is after the editing and before publishing; and the fourth is after 
the publication of the quoting works. 
 
The earlier the filtering judgment, the safer right-holders may feel, because it 
minimizes the chance of abuse. However, it also means that, from the viewpoint of 
freedom and creativity, early filtering activities reduce the chance of experiment, 
learning, and innovation, and thus reduce their benefits. Again, the risk of infringement 
 
211 See, Burk & Cohen, Id. at 61-62. 
Decoding DRM ? Editing (Cut, paste, mix) ? Publication of 
the quoted work 
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and the chance of new innovation involve many common processes, and the difference 
largely depends upon issues such as context, intention of the editors, and the manner of 
use or publication, which is sometimes difficult to decide before it is finally published. 
Generally speaking, possible damage to right-holders is caused by publication and 
dissemination of the infringing works. Therefore, before the quoting works are 
published and disseminated, it might be better to do the filtering as late as possible in 
order to respect the possibilities for experimenting, learning, and innovating. There 
could be even a system design in which all the filtering and judgment were done at the 
very end, i.e., after publication, which has been the rule in the analog world.212 
If the system integrators opt for review after publication, such ex ante review could 
possibly be done using a coded system, an institutionalized system, or a combination 
of the two. For example, if a DRM provider decided to allow editing and quoting using 
an editing software program that decodes the DRM but integrates an anonymous ID 
number with a watermark,213 a pilot program could be developed to search for cases 
 
212 The timing of judgment or filtering by technologies is closely related to the issue of private 
enforcement, which is generally prohibited by law. The de facto enforcement by private parties using 
technologies (or self-help) has been an issue for debate. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, An unhurried view of 
private ordering in information transactions, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2063 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright 
and the jurisprudence of self-help, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1089 (1998). From this standpoint, it can also 
be said that delaying the judgment is more consistent with legal enforcement systems. Except for a very 
clear violation, such as mass reproduction, there should be some policy to avoid too strict private 
enforcement and its chilling effects. 
213 The system has to be privacy-friendly, too. Therefore, in designing a review program, the 
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of clear violation for works already published.214 Still, such a pilot program could not 
understand and make decisions regarding the context or content of the work, which 
might need to be supplemented by human judgment in institutions, such as courts or 
alternative dispute resolution systems, or even preliminarily by legal staff hired by 
right-holders. 
In sum, it is possible to incorporate the freedoms extant within the copyright 
regime by combining coded and institutionalized systems even though the resulting 
freedoms would not be exactly the same as in the non-DRM world. Both the coded and 
institutionalized systems have their pros and cons, and the system designer should pay 
attention to the characteristics of each system to design a system with lower costs for 
users, right-holders, and system providers. 
However, the ability to provide such systemized freedom does not guarantee that it 
will be provided in the real world. System integrators, most of whose primary 
customers are right-holders and content providers, may not have an instant market 
 
management of ID-related information should be designed appropriately. See, e.g., J. Feigenbaum et al., 
Privacy Engineering for Digital Rights Management Systems, 2320 Lecture Notes in Computer Sci., 76 
(2002).See, also, Shamir, supra note 196. As another solution to privacy concerns, an effort to get 
consent from users may be required. See, e.g., J. Alex Halderman, Brent R. Waters, and Edward W. 
Felten, Privacy Management for Portable Recording Devices. Workshop on Privacy in Electronic 
Society, November 2004, http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jhalderm/papers/wpes2004.pdf, (last visited 
April 25, 2006). 
214 There is also a problem of who would design the protocol of the pilot and review programs, because 
it would function as a primary alternative to court decisions. If the protocol is not appropriate, it will 
cause large chilling effects. It could be an area where government intervention is worth considering. 
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incentive to design DRM systems with any integrated freedoms. Therefore, the next 
Section discusses the government’s possible choices to help DRM systems be more 
balanced by supporting the integration of coded and institutionalized freedoms. 
5.2.2.2 Legal Option supporting Coded and Institutionalized Approach for 
Freedom 
When thinking about the role of the government in helping system integrators keep 
a better balance in DRM systems, decisions should be made, again, by comparing the 
pros and cons caused by such government intervention. The following generally 
describes what the government can do to help create balanced DRM systems, as well 
as what it ought to avoid. 
5.2.2.2.1 Make Freedoms the Affirmative Rights of Copyright Users 
Probably the least intervening option to the market is to state user freedoms as 
affirmative rights rather than defenses, and leave all implementation issues to the 
market. One reason why market negotiation between right-holders and users (or their 
representatives) cannot effectively incorporate the freedom within DRM systems is 
because the freedom is recognized as a defense, while the interests of copyright 
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holders are protected as rights, as mentioned above.215 This first option gives both 
parties equal legal standing in order to help enable more balanced negotiations 
between the interested parties, which would result in a more balanced implementation 
of DRM usage rules. This option may or may not include changes of rules for free uses. 
In some cases, government should clear up some vagueness or fuzziness in the rules of 
freedom in order to reduce the transaction costs of judging the borders. 
For example, Masaya Otsuka at Sony thinks that such a legislative change might 
be helpful. 
If you ask me the questions of whether such “authorization of freedom 
as rights” will influence our negotiations with content owners, or 
influence the design of DRM systems or devices, I would say it is 
possible. If the rights are clearly stated as enforceable mandatory rights 
(and agreements against these rights are invalid), it would definitely 
have an impact. This is because we cannot sell products that infringe 
consumers’ rights….216 
However, Otsuka mentions that such user-friendly DRM may add some additional cost 
to the device makers’ side. In this regard, he mentions the importance of the rules of 
users’ rights being clear and relatively easy to implement. 
From the viewpoint of technologists and device makers, we would 
weigh (1) the amount of increased users’ merit against (2) increased 
production costs. The problem of a cost increase can be solved if we use 
simple and clear rules. If so, as a device maker, [stating exemptions as 
 
215 See, supra Section 5.3.2. 
216 Interview with Masaya Otsuka, Senior Patent Manager, Sony, in Tokyo, Japan (Apr. 8, 2004). 
117 
rights] is basically welcome. The difficult part would be to determine 
the rules. For example, if we take the example of private copying, how 
broad should it be, and what criteria should we use? Is it OK to give the 
copies you personally made to your grandparents? How about friends? 
What kind of information should we use to make decisions?217 
On the other hand, Otsuka is a little skeptical when users’ rights are voluntary. 
[I]f the rights are voluntary and waivable (or, when the nature or rights 
are not clear), the impact could be subtle. Content owners can choose 
not to use [user-friendly] DRM if they don’t like the offered terms…. In 
such a case, device makers would develop their products with careful 
attention to the expression of their advertisements and specifications (to 
make sure that consumers understand the devices don’t respect the 
freedoms stated as rights. If they understand and still buy them, could 
we argue that they agreed to waive the rights?). However, situations 
could be improved by business norms and free competition. Therefore, 
even waivable rights may push the trend of user-friendly DRM.218 
This concern that freedom is not being respected as much as expected is partly 
experienced in Europe, where the 2001 EU Copyright Directive took a mixed 
mandatory and voluntary approach to copyright exemptions with regard to 
anti-circumvention regulations. Even though Article 5 of the EU Copyright Directive 
clearly sets forth some exemptions that the member states are mandated to grant to 
copyright users, it does not clearly state whether they are users’ rights or defenses. In 
addition, Article 6 Paragraph 4 mandates member states to take “appropriate 





makes it sound as if they are rights).219 On the other hand, Article 6 also provides 
several significant loopholes to right-holders: for example, if there is an agreement 
between users and right-holders, such agreement takes precedence over stated 
exemptions.220 This means that the possible rights stated in Article 5 are, in practice, 
not considered mandatory but voluntary rights, or waivable rights by agreements. Also, 
by choosing on-demand online download services with agreements, content 
distributors are totally exempted from the obligation to pay attention to users’ rights.221 
These escape routes in Article 6 have been criticized for significantly undermining the 
meaning of Article 5.222 Therefore, making users’ rights optional may not be as 
powerful to help balance the interests between right-holders and copyright users.  
Therefore, it can be said that declaring some rights mandatory would help more in 
guiding the market toward more-balanced DRM systems. However, a different concern 
is raised by this idea of mandating users’ rights, mainly from the viewpoint of 
protecting privacy and confidential information. As Michael Miron explains: 
Someone suggested to us that we ought to build in, including into the 
standards, a set of mandatory [users’] rights. You must have an 
 
219 See, Article 6 (4)(1) of the EU Copyright Directive of 2001. The limitations that are required to be 
protected here are: copying privileges for libraries, researchers, museums, hospitals and disabled 
persons. See, Bechtold, supra note 209. 
220 See, Id.
221 See, Article 6 (4)(4) of the EU Copyright Directive of 2001. 
222 See, Bechtold, supra note 209. 
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involuntary grant that is available to anybody anytime. But as we 
thought about it, we started to think “Well, gee, I have a document 
called a PDF file. Do I really want to say that I have an involuntary 
grant to read that? What happens … if the PDF carries my medical 
records as if it is a novel?223 
This concern is surely legitimate. The question, however, is not about whether any 
of the ‘free uses’ recognized by copyright law should be a right; it is rather about the 
scope of rights, or how to deal with conflicts with other rights such as privacy. As can 
be seen below,224 even Miron agrees that some kind of freedoms, such as back-up 
copies of purchased entertainment content, can be a right.  
5.2.2.2.2 More Specific Carve-Out Provisions for Coded or Institutionalized 
Approaches to Freedom 
The more difficult question is: What kind of uses should be qualified as mandatory 
rights and how detailed should the statute be? If the market took the institutionalized 
approach rather than the coded approach, the rules of users’ rights could be stated 
relatively generally, because the judgment would be made by human intelligence. In 
fact, if the government decided to leave the rules as flexible as they are now, there 
would be no other choice for the market but to opt for some form of institutionalized 
 
223 Michael Miron, Opening Keynote Speech at Digital Rights Management Strategies 2004 conference 
(April 13, 2004). 
224 See, infra Section 5.2.2.2.2. 
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system to realize users’ rights. However, leaving all decisions to an institutionalized 
system is relatively costly, as has been pointed out.225 This is because the institution 
must make decisions similar to those made by the courts, and because users must take 
extra steps to seek judgments, which will chill spontaneous uses and small-value 
uses.226 
Therefore, if the government wants to help ensure more voluntary freedoms within 
DRM technologies that impose lower transaction costs on users, especially for systems 
using the coded approach, it would be helpful either to have more detailed rules that 
are easily coded or to delegate judgments.227 
Michael Miron explains this point: 
Fair use is a situation-specific defense against copyright infringement: it 
is not a pre-determined set of rights as one normally thinks about rights. 
As such, you cannot precisely define them in advance, although there 
have been some carve-outs in Europe to define some things.228 I’ve 
suggested to the U.S. government that they do the same thing. [They] 
said it’s kind of hard to do, so I don’t see a safe harbor anytime soon, 
although that’s more of the possibilities to assist systems 
implementers.229 
Miron elaborates the idea of providing carve-outs, using an example of making 
 
225 See, supra note 205. 
226 See, Id.
227 See, supra Section 5.4.2.2.1.1. 
228 See, the EU Copyright Directive of 2001, Article 5. 
229 Michael Miron, Opening Keynote Speech at Digital Rights Management Strategies 2004 conference 
(April 13, 2004). 
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back-up copies in the U.S. 
[T]he government could assist system implementers by carving out 
specific uses. For example, if the government said “it is legal to make 
one backup copy.”… you just now gave a safe harbor to systems 
designers, who could put a copy counted one in a backup mode, maybe 
tied to domains. [There are] a lot of different ways to implement it 
depending on devices. But if they said “That is an appropriate fair use, 
so go ahead,” then, that’s an example.… Is a backup a violation? 
Unknown. It clearly is an expectation by a lot of consumers, but under 
the law it is not clear whether it passes the test [of fair use]. So that is an 
example of something that the government, if they wanted to, could 
carve out and say that’s a safe harbor.230 
Tom Jacobs, Director of Research, Voodoo Sciences, Vanguard: Media 
Architecture & Technology Project at Sun Microsystems Laboratories agrees that the 
government may need to make the balanced rules clear. As Jacobs states: 
I hate to say we need more government, and you probably don’t want 
[the government to mandate technologies]. I think probably what you 
want are more defined guidelines as to what is inbounds and what’s out 
of bounds. What would be considered breaking copyright, and what 
would be considered fair use….231 
Another issue to be considered by the government is how finely the government 
defines users’ freedoms. The fineness of the rules might bias the market’s choice of the 
manner of implementation. This is because of the limits of computer abilities and costs 
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with the coded approach, as explained above. 232  The more general, the more 
situation-dependent, or the more context-dependent the rules become, the more likely 
it is that the market would opt for the institutionalized approach. On the other hand, if 
the rules are relatively specific without any substantial decisions about the context or 
substance of the use, the market can take the coded approach, too. 
5.2.2.2.3 Specify Coded or Institutionalized Approaches to Freedom by Law 
In addition to more finely defining the rules of users’ rights for the market to 
explore the opportunities for coded or institutionalized freedom, the government can 
step further into the manner of implementation to mandate specific coded or 
institutionalized freedom. While the previous option is just to make clear what the 
requirements for mandatory users’ rights are and leave the concrete implementation of 
the market (i.e., what part should be realized by the coded approach, and what others 
by the institutionalized approach, for example), this option is to specify what should be 
coded and what should be institutionalized. 
Even though this sounds as if the government is intervening significantly, and it 
probably is, there is already legislation that has taken this approach. For example, the 
U.S. Audio Home Recording Act is an example that clearly states that devices should 
 
232 See, supra Section 5.2.2.1.3. 
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take the coded approach for back-up copies.233 On the other hand, the EU Copyright 
Directive of 2001 is said to take a modified key-escrow approach, which is one form 
of the institutionalized approach.234 Article 6 Paragraph 4 of the EU Copyright 
Directive mandates Member States as follows: 
… in the absence of voluntary measures taken by right-holders, 
including agreements between right-holders and other parties concerned, 
Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that 
right-holders make available to the beneficiary of an exception or 
limitation provided for in national law … the means of benefiting from 
that exception or limitation, to the extent necessary to benefit from that 
exception or limitation and where that beneficiary has legal access to 
the protected work or subject-matter concerned.235 
According to the Commentary on European Copyright Law, the above Article is 
interpreted to allow, in certain cases, that Member States can require content providers 
to provide content users with circumvention devices or services.236 
Because the government intervention always gives some bias to the market, the 
government should avoid as much as possible mandating anything harmful or costly to 
technological innovation when government decides to take this approach. For example, 
legislation that requires system integrators to integrate “all the freedoms that are 
 
233 See, 17 U.S.C. §1001, §1002, and §1008. 
234 See, Bechtold, supra note 3 at 376. 
235 Article 6(4) Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
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available under the copyright law” into their DRM systems may be harmful rather than 
helpful, because it may be unclear and thus prohibitively costly to decide what “all the 
freedoms” means. Rather, the government should make more of an effort to specify or 
list the freedoms that should be respected even within the DRM world. 
Another thing that many technologists want the government to avoid, when 
stepping into a coded approach to freedom (or codes in general) is to mandate 
implementation of specific technology specifications. For example, Noboru Tohyama 
at Fujitsu, among others, clearly states this problem from two different directions: 
I don’t want the government to mandate technological standards, 
because that would trouble the department of technological research and 
development. It would also be problematic to regulate devices that 
would not react to DRM systems. There are only two ways to do so: 
either they specify the technologies and mandate to incorporate them; or 
you have to make your devices respond to every possible DRM system 
available, which would require unlimited effort. Either way, I don’t 
want to see it happen.237 
It might be possible under some circumstances that government would specify the 
freedom to be coded, but without determining the actual specifications of the 
technologies. Determining the actual specifications should be left to the market, as 
many have already pointed out.238 
237 Interview with Noboru Tohyama, Fujitsu, in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 22, 2002). 
238 See, Burk & Cohen, supra note 193 at 55-57; Bechtold, supra note 3 at 368-71, 
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With regard to institutionalized freedom, there could be a diversity of levels of 
government intervention. The government could set guidelines of what should be 
followed by institutions and leave their formation and governance to the market.239 
The other extreme example would be that the government itself run the institution.240 
Or, alternatively, the government could seek applications from private entities to 
handle the processes in question, designate or approve appropriate groups, and 
supervise their operation.241 Also, as discussed above, it is important to notice that the 
issue of who takes control over the organization would impact the fairness of the 
judgment.242 
As described above, the government would always bias the market by how detailed 
its requirements for the freedoms incorporated into DRM systems were.243 Whether 
further government involvement in system implementation is necessary or desirable 
should be left for later research, with more study on how the market can properly 
 
239 A close example is Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which 
coordinates the management of the technical elements of the Domain Name System to ensure universal 
resolvability. The actual implementation are delegated to local representatives. See, ICANN home page, 
http://www.icann.org/general/ (last visited April 27, 2006). Note, however, that the highly-centralized 
structure of rule making by ICANN calls attention regarding antitrust law in the U.S. See, A. Michael 
Froomkin and Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1 (2001). 
240 An example is the U.S. copyright registration system by the U.S. Copyright Office. 
241 An example is the Japanese copyright registration for software programs. See, Law on Exceptional 
Provisions for the Registration of Program Works, Chapter III. 
242 See, supra Section 5.2.2.1.3. 
243 See, supra Section 5.2.2.2.2. 
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realize the rules of users’ rights set by the government, as well as the possible negative 
impacts of government’s imposing specific system designs. 
6. Conclusion 
This article has shown that the problem of DRM systems overriding freedoms of 
copyright uses incorporated within the copyright regime are largely coming from the 
unbalanced implementation of DRM technologies, and that the current 
anti-circumvention regulations have fixed this problem by blindly prohibiting one 
means of solution: i.e., circumvention of DRM technologies that cause the problems. 
This research also shows that the anti-circumvention regulations are causing chilling 
effects and other negative impacts on scientific research regarding DRM technologies. 
By comparing anti-circumvention regulations between the U.S. and Japan, this 
research shows that the implementation made in the DMCA is not the only solution: 
rather, it shows that a more modest implementation like in Japan can be possible and 
desirable. In order to support such limited implementation, this research also revisits 
the rationale behind anti-circumvention regulations and shows that legally prohibiting 
the circumvention of DRM systems may not be important to stop piracy and to support 
content business as it first appears. 
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This research also shows, based on actual voices of key players in the market, that 
the market would not function efficiently to implement within the DRM systems the 
freedom of copyright use incorporated within the copyright law. This is because there 
is imbalance in legal standings between right-holders and users; the mindset and/or 
ability of the right-holders who have the power to decide the implementation rules are 
not ready to respect the freedoms; and also because the voices of users are currently 
not well represented in the market. After such extensive market analysis, this research 
terns to see what law can do to help to bring DRM systems more balanced. It suggests 
two solutions: repeal anti-circumvention regulations when DRM systems are 
imbalanced, and keep proper balance within the framework of anti-circumvention 
regulations. The latter choice can be broken down to two options. One is to give a 
properly-tailored “right to hack” when there is legitimate reason to do so. The other is 
to incorporate tools to embody freedom within the DRM system without giving a right 
to hack. This research shows by using a concrete example that many of the freedoms 
can be incorporated into DRM systems by combining coded approach using computer 
systems and institutionalized approach using human intelligence. At the end, this 
research provides three legal option to support freedom to be incorporated within the 
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DRM system: to declare the freedoms as affirmative (and preferably mandatory) rights 
of users to give users equal legal standings; to establish more detailed and clear carve 
out provisions to make it easy for DRM systems to implement; and to specify the 
actual manner of implementation by law. It also points out what the government has to 
pay attention in order to avoid market confusion when taking these steps: the most 
important one is to make the rule clear enough, as well as to avoid mandating 
particular technological specifications. 
A decade has passed since the 1996 WIPO treaties has brought a significant change 
to the world of copyright. And we have seen more than enough problems in these new 
technologies and regulations. Hopefully this research has provided an opportunity to 
understand why the efforts in the DRM technologies have been rather painful for both 
right-holders and copyright users, and to show some steps to improve the current legal 
and market situation to realize a better-balanced world of copyright with DRM 
technologies. 
